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ABSTRACT 
 
Different Strokes for Different But Reasonable Folks: Comparison of Legally Relevant 
Observers’ Perceptions of Custody 
by 
Fabiana Alceste  
Advisor: Saul Kassin 
 
The Fifth Amendment guarantees the right against compelled self-incrimination. In 
Miranda v. Arizona (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court extended this right to police interrogations. 
In that landmark ruling, the Court required police to inform suspects in custody of their rights to 
silence and counsel during custodial interrogations. Custody is determined by evaluating the 
objective circumstances of the questioning and asking whether a reasonable person would have 
felt free to leave. Previous research on attributions of freedom shows that people perceive 
situations with regard to freedom differently depending on their perspective—for example, a 
person in a stressful situation may not feel free to leave, while an outside observer would perceive 
the person to be free. The custody standard does not consider this difference between actors and 
observers. Since custody is the trigger for Miranda warnings and other legal protections, it is 
important to study custody from a psychological standpoint to ensure that those who need legal 
protections do in fact receive them.  
This dissertation is an extension of previous research showing that actors and observers 
differ in their perceptions of custody (Alceste, Luke & Kassin, 2018). Importantly, the Court 
believes that subjects in noncustodial interviews should feel freer to leave than those in custodial 
interrogations. Although observers of questioning sessions did differentiate between the two, those 
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actually being questioned did not feel freer in interviews than in interrogations. The current studies 
test new samples of observers. First, I compared the perceptions of adolescents (who reliably 
display low comprehension of Miranda warnings) to adults. Participants watched either an 
interview or an interrogation and provided their perceptions of the subject’s freedom. As expected, 
adolescents perceived greater restriction than adults across questioning type. Next, I compared 
laypeople to samples of police and judges, two legally relevant samples whose custodial 
perceptions have not yet been tested. These participants read vignettes of questioning scenarios 
with varying degrees of custody and provided their perceptions of freedom. As expected, 
participants reported the greatest perceptions of freedom in the low-custody vignettes, followed 
by ambiguous and then high-custody. Laypeople generally perceived more restriction than police 
and judges, although this result was especially pronounced in the low-custody vignette—judges 
and, to an even greater extent, police overestimated both how free the suspect was and how free 
they thought he would feel, compared to laypeople. Interestingly, the way the perceptions of 
freedom question was worded had a great influence on responses—participants reported that the 
suspect was objectively freer than he felt, and that they themselves would feel freer than the 
suspect. The implications of these results are discussed, especially the fact that there was 
substantial variation in participants’ responses despite the Court’s assertion that custody is an 
objective standard. 
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Different Strokes for Different But Reasonable Folks: 
Comparison of Legally Relevant Observers’ Perceptions of Custody 
 
The Fifth Amendment guarantees the right against compelled self-incrimination. In 
Miranda v. Arizona (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court extended this right to police questioning when 
it held that custodial interrogations were inherently coercive. In fact, the Court stated that suspects 
in custodial interrogations need extra protection because they are subject to trickery, intimidation, 
restricted personal freedom, hostility from law enforcement, pressure to speak against one’s own 
will, an unfamiliar environment, and other psychological tactics designed to elicit confessions 
from suspects (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966). In that landmark ruling, the Court required police to 
inform suspects in custody of their rights to silence and counsel and to obtain a waiver of these 
rights voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.  
Recently, psychological and legal experts have questioned the effectiveness of Miranda 
warnings to protect suspects against coercion (for an overview, see Smalarz, Scherr, & Kassin, 
2016; Baldwin, 1993; Kassin, 2005; Kassin & Norwick, 2004; Leo, 1996b; Rogers et al., 2010; 
Weisselberg, 2017). As a result of numerous wrongful convictions, many of which involved false 
confessions, recent reform efforts have thus focused on an additional safeguard: the requirement 
that all interrogations be video-recorded in their entirety. The American Psychology-Law Society 
published a White Paper on the psychology of interrogations and confessions that heavily 
recommends the use of video-recording (Kassin et al., 2010). According to experts, video-
recording interrogations is a useful safeguard because it will deter investigators from using 
flagrantly coercive interrogation tactics, while simultaneously protecting investigators from false 
claims of coercion by suspects. Video-recordings also provide transparent and objective records 
of what occurred during an interrogation, which is useful for judges, who make decisions about 
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the voluntariness of the confession, and juries, who then evaluate its credibility.. Starting with 
Alaska in 1985, the movement to video-record has reached half of all states, the District of 
Columbia, and all federal agencies, which now mandate the video-recording of all or most 
custodial interrogations (Bang, Stanton, Hemmens & Stohr, 2018; Sullivan, 2016). As with 
Miranda, the video-recording safeguard is activated once the accused is in a state of “custodial 
interrogation.” But when is this state triggered, and how is it evaluated?   
Custody: Parameters and Analysis 
At its simplest definition, custodial interrogation is “questioning initiated by law 
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his 
freedom of action in any significant way” (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966, p. 445). Specifically, the 
Court distinguishes interrogations from other types of questioning by investigators’ use of tactics 
known to elicit an incriminating response from the subject. In light of the “inherently compelling” 
nature of custodial interrogations (p. 467), the U.S. Supreme Court sought to create an objective 
test to help judges and police determine when a suspect is in custody. First and foremost, formal 
arrest triggers custody and hence the required protections (Orozco v. Texas, 1969).  In more 
ambiguous cases where police question suspects who are not under arrest, however, “the ultimate 
inquiry is simply whether there [was]… restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated 
with formal arrest” (California v. Beheler 1983, p. 1125). Specifically, the court must holistically 
evaluate the individual and compounding effects of the factors present in the interrogation and 
determine whether there was a strong possibility of coercion in a police-controlled environment 
(Berkemer v. McCarty, 1984; Howes v. Fields, 2012; J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 2011). As the Court 
of Appeal of California recently put it, “where there has been no formal arrest the question whether 
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a custodial interrogation took place presents an intensely factual inquiry into the totality of the 
circumstances…. each situation is unique” (People v. Torres, 2018, p. 7; emphasis added).  
Due to the uniqueness of each case and the fact that custody determinations can be 
especially ambiguous if both custodial and noncustodial factors are present, the Court has invested 
a notable amount of time and effort in identifying the parameters of custody. After years of 
analyzing case facts and refining definitions, the resultant custody test is two-pronged. First, the 
objective circumstances of the questioning are critical in determining whether a suspect was in 
custody vs. free to leave during questioning. Second, these circumstances are not evaluated from 
the point of view of the suspect, but rather from the perspective of a “reasonable person.” 
Objective circumstances. In the years since Miranda, courts have delineated the relevant 
factors in a police interrogation that may suggest whether a suspect was or was not free to leave. 
The 8th Circuit in United States v. Griffin (1990) identified the following six factors: (1) whether 
police explicitly stated to the suspect that s/he was not under arrest and free to go; (2) whether the 
police did not restrict the suspect’s freedom of movement; (3) whether the police-citizen encounter 
was initiated by the suspect and/or whether s/he was questioned voluntarily; (4) whether police 
employed deceptive or coercive interrogation techniques during the questioning (e.g. employing 
multiple armed police officers in the questioning; isolating the suspect and refusing to allow 
friends and family to see him/her; questioning the suspect for a lengthy period of time; accusing 
or threatening the suspect); (5) whether the atmosphere of the questioning was under police control 
(e.g. questioning the suspect in a police station or an otherwise locked room; handcuffing the 
suspect; confiscating the suspect’s personal belongings); and (6) whether the suspect was formally 
arrested after the questioning. Later, in United States v. Brown (1993), the 8th Circuit specified that 
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the first three factors suggest that the suspect was free to leave but the latter three are indicative 
that the person was in custody.  
Illustrating that the totality of the circumstances test prevails over any single factor, the 
presence of the same condition in different scenarios will not always yield the same conclusion. 
Instead, custodial and noncustodial factors are weighed against each other and evaluated in terms 
of their interactive and compounding effects. To illustrate, consider three cases with a common 
factor: the confiscation of a personal item. In U.S. v. Adames (1995), two police officers stopped 
the defendant as he walked to his car. They cornered him and stood in between Adames and a wall, 
blocking his path. Police then escorted him to his car, where they took possession of his car keys, 
which they did not return. The court found that the police had restricted Adames’ freedom of action 
by blocking his way and seizing his keys, thereby communicating to Adames that he was in 
custody.  
U.S. v. Longbehn (1988) reached a similar conclusion. Police requested that Longbehn give 
up access to his personal gun by placing it in the trunk of their police car. They escorted him to 
the police station and then to his home, where the police continued to supervise him. Again, 
because of the restriction on Longbehn’s freedom of action, a U.S. Court of Appeals found that he 
was in custody before being arrested. However, in the more recent case of U.S. v. Swan (2016), 
the suspect was found not to be in custody even though police confiscated her cell phone while 
she was being questioned at a police station. Why the difference in custody rulings between these 
three similar cases? Ultimately, the suspect in Swan was not in custody because although police 
seized her phone, they also told her that she was free to leave. The presence of this Beheler 
admonishment (i.e., “free-to-leave” warning) almost always takes precedence over custodial 
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factors to suggest that the suspect was not in custody (California v. Beheler, 1983; Howes v. Fields, 
2006; Oregon v. Mathiason, 1977; cf. People v. Antonio Torres, 2018).  
One case exemplifies the power of this free-to-leave warning. In Howes v. Fields (2012), 
the U.S. Supreme Court described the case of an inmate in a Michigan jail named Randall Lee 
Fields. Fields was interrogated at the jail one evening for 5 to 7 hours by armed sheriff’s deputies 
for a different crime than the one for which he was imprisoned. The Court held that Fields was not 
in custody even though he was already a prisoner and legally in the state’s custody; that he was 
questioned through the night, during which time he was normally asleep; and that the police used 
a “very sharp tone” (p. 1193). The single factor that offset those coercive circumstances was that 
the interrogators told Fields that at his request he would be free to return to his cell. The Court 
further justified its ruling by stating that Fields was offered food and water, the room was “not 
uncomfortable”, and the door to the interrogation room was “sometimes left open” (p. 1193).  
Just as the courts have identified factors relevant to the custody inquiry, they have also 
determined that certain conditions are irrelevant to this inquiry. For example, the amount of 
information the police have about the suspect and the amount of time between the crime and 
questioning are not part of the test (California v. Beheler, 1983). Factors that would require police 
officers to form a subjective opinion are also irrelevant. Specifically, the suspect’s personal 
characteristics, including experience with law enforcement, should not be considered in 
determining custody (Yarborough v. Alvarado, 2005). In Stansbury v. California (1994), the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that custody depends on “the objective circumstances of the interrogation, 
not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being 
questioned" (p. 323). As such, courts do not consider subjective opinions, like the suspect’s 
perception of freedom, when determining custody. Indeed, the objective circumstances described 
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in this section are not to be considered from the perspective of either the suspect or the police. 
Rather, the Supreme Court asks whether a reasonable person in the situation would have felt a 
significant restriction of his or her freedom of action (Berkemer v. McCarty, 1984; Stansbury v. 
California, 1994). In other words, “Would a reasonable person…have felt free simply to get up 
and walk out of the...room…at will?” (Yarborough v. Alvarado, 2004, p. 670). 
The reasonable person standard. The reasonable person standard, which is a central tenet 
of the custody inquiry in criminal procedure, was originally associated with tort law. In the 19th 
century, English courts created the standard to determine whether the defendant of a suit was 
negligent by asking whether a “reasonable man” would have taken certain actions to prevent harm 
or injury (Gardner, 2015). For example, in Vaughan v. Menlove (1837), the defendant built a 
haystack next to his neighbor’s land and constructed it in such a way as to prevent it from 
spontaneously combusting. Others in the neighborhood informed him that the way he built the 
haystack was dangerous, but he ignored their suggestions to rebuild it. The haystack did indeed 
catch fire, burning down two cottages on his neighbor’s property. The court found that the 
defendant had been negligent. Instead of holding him to the standard of his own judgment—which 
could vary widely depending on the characteristics of the defendant—the court preferred a more 
objective standard: whether a “man of ordinary prudence” would have taken additional precautions 
to prevent the fire. Since then, the reasonable person standard has spread to contract law, 
administrative law, the law of trusts, and criminal law (Gardner, 2015).  
Around the same time, in France, Adolphe Quetelet developed the concept of l’homme 
moyen, the reasonable man, in his pioneering book on social physics (Beirne, 1987; Quetelet, 
1835). In it, Quetelet describes that the reasonable man is the average man—an amalgam of the 
average characteristics of each person in the relevant society, including height and weight, cross-
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tabulated by age, gender, occupation, and geographical location (Beirne, 1987). A recent review 
of the reasonable person standard in tort law uses economic principles to describe Quetelet’s 
l’homme moyen as a positive (vs. normative) definition of the reasonable person (Miller & Perry, 
2012). Positive definitions are based on empirical observations of what constitutes a reasonable 
person and his/her reasonable actions in society; normative definitions use a cost-benefit analysis 
of the (1) probability of harm, (2) magnitude of the possible harm, and (3) burden of preventing 
that harm to determine whether taking a certain action is reasonable. Miller and Perry argued that 
only normative definitions of the reasonable person standard should be considered in tort and other 
types of law, though to my knowledge, this view is not widespread and has not been adopted by 
legal decision-makers.  
In criminal law, the reasonable person standard assumes that taking the perspective of a 
reasonable person is an objective, unbiased test, and thus is preferable to having detectives evaluate 
each case from the idiosyncratic perspective of the suspect involved (J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 
2011). Yet the Court did not identify any discernible characteristics of the reasonable person (and 
has not endorsed or rejected Quetelet’s definition of the average man), how this person might differ 
from the suspect in his/her perceptions of freedom, or how to account for the fact that individuals 
interpret events differently based on their previous experiences.  
As demonstrated by the number of law reviews analyzing the reasonable person standard 
(e.g. Gardner, 2001; 2015; Grano, 1979; Miller & Perry, 2012), the lack of clarity around this 
standard is troubling. As one legal expert argued, “even if reasonable people could agree on the 
relevant factors to consider, they inevitably would disagree on how the relevant factors should be 
weighted” (Grano, 1979, p. 884). Even the Supreme Court has conceded that reasonable persons 
can reach different conclusions about custody while examining the same facts of the interrogation 
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(Yarborough v. Alvarado, 2005). Though the Court has stated that the current custody test provides 
“clear guidance” for police and trial judges (Yarborough v. Alvarado, 2005, p. 668), numerous 
overturned cases and strongly-worded dissenting opinions suggest that this test does not provide 
sufficient clarity or guidance to the relevant decision-makers. 
In summary, courts use the objective circumstances test, operationalized via the reasonable 
person standard, to determine whether a suspect was in custody during questioning—and thus was 
entitled to safeguards: namely, Miranda warnings and video-recording. Consequently, the context 
and manner of the questioning, which I turn to next, are particularly germane to the custody 
inquiry. 
Police Questioning 
In criminal investigations, a distinction is often drawn between interviews and 
interrogations. The Reid Technique, a common American interrogation technique, distinguishes 
between these two types of questioning sessions (Inbau, Reid, Buckley & Jayne, 2013). Interviews 
are generally non-accusatory and consist of open-ended information-gathering questions that allow 
the subject to express his or her opinions about the situation. Interrogations, on the other hand, are 
accusatory, confrontational, and allow for very little dialogue, as the interrogator spends most of 
the session deploying various interrogation tactics aimed at eliciting an admission of guilt followed 
by a narrative confession. 
Interviews  
Interviews are non-accusatory sessions used to gather information about the crime from 
witnesses and potential suspects. Those trained in the Reid Technique are also taught to use this 
process to determine whether the individuals they question are telling the truth or lying (Inbau, et 
al., 2013; for reviews and critiques on deception detection, see Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Hartwig 
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& Bond, 2011; Kassin & Fong, 1999; Luke, in press; Vrij, Mann & Fisher, 2006). The investigator 
is trained to use a non-accusatory tone in interviews regardless of whether the subject is a victim, 
witness, or has the potential to become a suspect. Investigators may buttress the appearance of 
voluntariness in an interview by informing the subject that it is in his/her best interest to cooperate 
with the investigation and are permitted to lie to the subject by falsely saying that others have 
already agreed to be interviewed (Inbau et al., 2013). 
 A classic interview is a structured question-and-answer session. The types of questions 
investigators are trained to ask were specifically designed with the goal of provoking verbal and 
nonverbal behaviors in subjects that questioners then attempt to use to detect deception. This is 
known as the Behavior Analysis Interview (BAI), and it is comprised of a combination of open-
ended, direct, and behavior-provoking questions (e.g., “Jim, what do you think should happen to 
the person who started this fire?”[Inbau et al., 2013, p. 160]; “Jim, who do you suspect may have 
started this fire?” [p. 157]). The BAI is predicated on the notion that innocent and guilty subjects 
will provide different types of responses that allow a trained investigator to distinguish between 
truthful and deceptive individuals. For example, if an interview subject recommends leniency for 
the perpetrator in response to a question about criminal consequences, s/he is typically viewed 
with suspicion because the Reid Technique assumes that a guilty subject would attempt to protect 
him/herself from a harsh punishment. In contrast, someone who recommends prosecuting the 
perpetrator to the fullest extent of the law may be judged innocent because innocent people should 
be outraged by crime and should adopt punitive attitudes toward criminals. No empirical research 
has substantiated the Reid Technique’s claims about the BAI. 
Furthermore, the Reid Technique identifies various nonverbal responses that are presumed 
to indicate deception, such as covering one’s mouth, crossing one’s arms or legs, and averting eye 
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gaze. Despite the fact that psychological experts have discredited the use of nonverbal cues in 
detecting deception (Granhag, Vrij, & Verschuere, 2015; Luke, in press; Vrij, 2008), some 
investigators are encouraged to use them to determine whether the interviewee is suspicious and 
should thus graduate to the next type of questioning: an interrogation. 
Interrogations 
In contrast to interviewing, interrogation is an accusatory, guilt-presumptive process, the 
goal of which is to elicit a confession. Interrogation tactics attempt to increase the stress associated 
with denial and decrease the stress associated with confession. Once a suspect capitulates and 
makes an initial admission, interrogators are trained to convert that statement into a full narrative 
confession (Inbau et. al., 2013; for a critique of these processes, see Kassin, 1997; 2006).  
As described by Inbau et al. (2013), the Reid Technique delineates a nine-step interrogation 
procedure that is essentially reducible to three processes: isolation, confrontation, and 
minimization (see Kassin, 2005). First, the suspect is physically and socially isolated in a police 
interrogation room, away from friends, family, or anyone who the suspect may consider an ally. 
The questioning usually takes place in a small, windowless room with two chairs and a small table.  
The investigator is trained to seat him/herself in front of the suspect, but not to use the table or any 
other furniture as a barrier between the two individuals. 
Next, the interrogator confronts the suspect by accusing him/her of the crime in question 
with absolute certainty and consistently rejects the suspect’s denials and objections. Furthermore, 
by presenting evidence of the suspect’s guilt, the investigator aims to dissuade the suspect from 
denying involvement in the crime. When no such evidence exists, the investigator is trained to 
bluff or lie about evidence that points to the suspect—for example, police may cite fictitious 
eyewitness accounts, fingerprint analyses, or even falsely state that an alleged accomplice is in the 
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next room implicating the suspect. These confrontational procedures, known as maximization, are 
meant to increase the suspect’s anxiety associated with denying involvement by convincing him 
or her that the case against them is strong. 
A third category of interrogation techniques aims to develop a theme that provides the 
suspect with a moral justification for committing the crime. This tactic is known as minimization 
because it trivializes the moral seriousness of the crime. One possible byproduct of minimization 
is that it trivializes the legal seriousness of the crime and thus creates the implication that a 
confession will be met with leniency (Kassin & McNall, 1991). Interrogators attempt to convince 
the suspect that the police are understanding, sympathetic, and are willing and able to help the 
suspect if s/he is perceived to be honest and cooperative. Examples of these minimizing themes 
include blaming the victim for provoking the offense (e.g. “Joe, no woman should be on the street 
alone at night looking as sexy as she did…it’s too much of a temptation for any normal man” 
[Inbau et al., 2013, p. 221]); suggesting a morally acceptable reason for the offense (e.g. “The 
suggestion that alcohol affected his judgment permits the suspect an opportunity to ‘save face’ by 
blaming alcohol for his conduct” [p. 214]); and normalizing the behavior by suggesting that 
anyone might have reacted in the same way (e.g. “You are no different than anyone else and, under 
the same circumstances, I probably would have done what you did” [p. 210]). Interrogators are 
encouraged to switch between different types of themes and find one that resonates with the 
suspect in order to enhance the effect of the tactic.  
After a substantial amount of minimization theme development, the investigator may 
attempt to seek an initial admission of guilt by asking an “alternative question” that will 
incriminate the suspect, no matter how he or she responds (e.g. “Did you plan on doing this since 
the day you got married or did it pretty much happen on the spur of the moment because of the 
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fight you had?” [Inbau et al., 2013, p. 295]). After the suspect responds to this question, 
interrogators then attempt to turn a mere admission into a full narrative confession with details, 
apologies, and motive statements.  
Although interviews (involving witnesses who may or may not become suspects) and 
interrogations (involving suspects who are accused) are not necessarily distinct in practice, these 
processes serve as a proxy for noncustodial and custodial questioning, respectively. Yet despite 
the pivotal importance of custody, little empirical research has examined the courts’ assumptions; 
namely, (1) whether circumstances in the questioning lead to objective perceptions of custody 
regardless of perspective, and (2) whether the reasonable person standard is an unbiased way to 
determine custody. Drawing upon the classic social psychology literature on attributions of 
causality and freedom, the present research aimed to add to the nascent literature on police custody.   
Attributions of Freedom and Perspective-Taking 
The express purpose of the objective test and the reasonable person standard is to relieve 
investigators of the “burden of anticipating the frailties or idiosyncrasies of every person whom 
they question” (People v. Rodney P., 1967, p. 10). Yet even with this objective test, divining 
another person’s state of mind is a difficult task. Social psychological research on attributions 
shows that individuals often have different interpretations of the same situation based on their 
perspective. In applying social psychological constructs to the custody inquiry, one can see how 
the “objectivity” of the reasonable person standard is problematic. During police questioning, the 
perspective of the suspect is unique. Lawyers, judges, jurors, police, and other observers engage 
in different mental processes than the suspect, which may lead to opposing perceptions of custody.  
 The actor-observer divergence. Despite its essential role in law, psychologists know little 
about the conditions that influence judgments of freedom. Nevertheless, the existing social 
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psychological literature on attribution is particularly pertinent to the custody inquiry. Fritz Heider’s 
(1958) pioneering work on how humans explain each other’s behavior as naïve scientists, led 
attribution theorists to examine whether individuals interpret social behavior and events differently 
based on their visual perspective.  
Over the years, research has shown that while attempting to explain the behavior of others, 
people commit the fundamental attribution error—they overlook the role of situational factors and 
focus instead on dispositional characteristics of the actor (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Jones, 1990; 
Ross, 1977; for a retrospective overview of this research, see Ross, 2018). In contrast, studies of 
self-perception indicate that actors focus outward, on aspects of the environment that impinge on 
their behavior, which leads them to make situational attributions. This divergence in perceptions 
is known as the actor-observer effect (Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Watson, 1982). Using an array of 
methods, research has confirmed that whereas actors tend to attribute their behavior to the 
situation, observers tend to make personal attributions to the actor (Harre, Brandt, & Houkamau, 
2004; Malle, 2006; Nisbett, Caputo, Legant & Marecek, 1973; Saulnier & Perlman, 1981; 
Schoeneman & Rubanowitz, 1985).  
One theory used to explain the actor-observer bias is that actors possess autobiographical 
information, in which they represent constants in their own lives (Watson, 1982). As such, the 
external characteristics of the environment are more salient to them than their own ever-present 
traits, motivations, expectations, and experiences. The external salient factors then become more 
suitable candidates as explanations of their behavior. Observers, not privy to this information and 
eager to satisfy the human need to find patterns and predictability in an ever-changing world, 
assume that the actor’s behavior is a function of his or her own stable personality characteristics.  
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Relatedly, Jones and Nisbett (1972) proposed the social-cognitive theory that actor-
observer differences are due to differences in visual orientation; actors are visually focused 
outwardly on the environment—they cannot see themselves as they act. As such, they perceive 
their behavior as a response to the environment that is so salient in their visual field. The actor, on 
the other hand, is the visual focus of the observer, emphasizing the actor’s behavior and 
deemphasizing the surrounding environment. This visual perception theory is related to the illusory 
causation phenomenon, or video-perspective bias, prevalent in the interrogations literature—
confession tapes that visually focus on the suspect are consistently perceived as more voluntary 
than those that focus either on the interrogator or on both actors equally (Lassiter, Geers, Handley, 
Weiland & Munhall, 2002; Lassiter & Irvine, 1986).  
 Attributions of freedom and custody. Perhaps the closest attribution researchers have 
come to examining “custody” was in a study by Harvey, Harris, and Barnes (1975) on perceptions 
of responsibility and freedom. In a variation on Milgram’s (1963) classic obedience shock 
paradigm, participants in their experiment were randomly assigned to participate either as the 
teacher, who administers the shock, or as an observer, who was seated behind the teacher. By 
random assignment, the learner (the confederate recipient of the shocks) exhibited either moderate 
or severe distress. At the end of each session, the teacher and observer answered questions about 
the experience. They found that when the learner exhibited great distress, observers attributed more 
freedom and responsibility to the teachers who, in turn, attributed less freedom and responsibility 
to themselves. Harvey et al. (1975) provided a useful framework through which to view the 
custody inquiry. Their results suggest that neutral observers might attribute more freedom to 
suspects by discounting the stress and pressure inherent in police questioning. Conversely, 
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suspects may attribute less freedom and responsibility themselves, based on pressures that are only 
apparent to them.  
 In the first ever empirical attempt to examine perceptions of custody, Alceste, Luke, and 
Kassin (2018) designed two experiments from the perspectives of both actors and observers and 
found an actor-observer asymmetry that closely resembled Harvey et al.’s (1975) results. Using a 
novel paradigm to investigate the custody inquiry, Alceste et al. examined whether actors 
randomly assigned to be interviewed or interrogated held different perceptions of their own 
freedom compared to observers of their sessions. In Study 1, student participants were led to 
believe that the theft of a wallet had taken place during their time in the lab. In this situation in 
which the stakes were perceived to be real, they were then briefly interviewed as witnesses or 
interrogated as suspects by a security guard who arrived to investigate. Interviews and 
interrogations embodied specific factors considered noncustodial or custodial, respectively. 
Observers then watched videos of these sessions.  
Suspects who were interviewed in a situation that the courts would define as noncustodial 
did not feel significantly freer to leave than those who were interrogated, a situation containing 
factors that the courts might well define as custodial. In contrast, and in keeping with the courts’ 
assumptions, observers did make this distinction, seeing those who were interviewed vs. 
interrogated as free to leave. Study 2 focused on the interview condition. Participants were 
randomly assigned to either receive an explicit pre-advisement that they were free to leave (a 
Beheler admonishment) or receive no advisement. Compared to the no-advisement control group 
and to observers, advised participants indicated they were free to leave as an objective matter but 
did not feel free to do so.  
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The striking divergence obtained between actors and observers was surprising considering 
that both populations consisted of adult laypersons. In reality, however, legally relevant actors and 
observers in police questioning sessions possess characteristics, knowledge, motivations, and 
experiences that may influence their custody perceptions. For example, juveniles are a population 
of potential suspects who exhibit poor comprehension of Miranda warnings (Zelle, Romaine & 
Goldstein, 2015), are often subjected to adult-style police interrogations (Cleary, 2017; Feld, 
2013), and are at a heightened vulnerability to police-induced false confessions (Owen-Kostelnik, 
Reppucci, & Meyer, 2006; Redlich & Goodman, 2003). 
Although there is much research on adolescents’ comprehension of Miranda, no research 
to date has studied juvenile perceptions of custody, a highly related concept. There is also no 
research on police officers who make real-time custody determinations in the field when deciding 
whether to Mirandize a suspect or record the interrogation. Finally, when a defendant claims that 
he or she was not Mirandized, to which detectives counter that the defendant was not in custody, 
it is a professional trial judge—an observer far removed from the “average” reasonable person—
who rules on custody at a pretrial suppression hearing. Yet the perceptions of judges have also not 
been tested.  
 In the Alceste et al. (2018) studies, after indicating their perceptions of whether the actors 
were free to leave, observers were asked to imagine themselves in the suspect’s position and to 
indicate whether they would feel free to leave the situation. Consistent with previous research on 
perspective-taking (Davis, Conklin, Smith & Luce, 1996; Davis et al., 2004; Galinsky & 
Moskowitz, 2000; Regan & Totten, 1975), the actor-observer divergence vanished when observers 
imagined themselves from the actor’s perspective. These results present an interesting implication 
for the reasonable person standard in judgments of custody: compared to when they judged the 
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freedom of the actor, observers reported a reduced feeling of freedom when they imagined that 
they themselves were being questioned. Though it contradicts the reasonable person standard, 
Supreme Court Justices have recommended that evaluators take the perspective of the subject 
when determining custody: “…I have no doubt that the state trier of fact is best situated to put 
himself in the suspect’s shoes, and consequently is in a better position to determine what it would 
have been like for a reasonable man to be in the suspect’s shoes” (Thompson v. Keohane, 1995, p. 
119). In addition to examining the perspectives of adolescents, judges, and police officers, the 
present studies aim to replicate Alceste et al.’s (2018) result that a perspective-taking instruction 
attenuates the actor-observer difference.  
Adolescents and the Legal System 
“That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad 
in his early teens.” (Haley v. Ohio, 1948, p. 599) 
 
A wealth of research on adolescents shows that they represent an especially vulnerable 
population in the criminal justice system. Juveniles display certain characteristics, collectively 
indicating an “immaturity of judgment”, that put them disproportionately at risk to make short-
sighted legal decisions not in their best interests (Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000; Owen-Kostelnik 
et al., 2006; for a recent overview, see the American Psychological Association et al., amicus brief 
in Dassey v. Dittman, 2018). The U.S. Supreme Court has thus acknowledged that juveniles should 
be treated with “special care” in the legal system, especially in the context of interrogations that 
can coerce fully functional adults (In re Gault, 1967; Gallegos v. Colorado, 1962).   
Developing Judgment 
Adolescent brains are underdeveloped in the areas associated with emotion processing, 
self-control, decision-making, and reward-sensitivity, which may lead to unsophisticated and 
short-sighted reasoning and greater susceptibility to social influence, impulsivity, and 
18 
 
suggestibility than adults (Steinberg, 2009). In a review on adolescent decision-making, Steinberg 
and Cauffman (1996) describe how the ongoing development of neurological structures allows for 
improvement of adolescents’ sense of responsibility, temperance, and perspective: aspects of 
judgment that depend on the development of other psychosocial characteristics. Before adolescents 
fully develop biologically and psychosocially, they may be at risk during custodial interrogations 
(Steinberg, 2009). 
One problem is that adolescents have not fully developed their sense of autonomy and 
independence (Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996). Though the shift from early childhood comes with 
a complementary shift in reliance on parents and/or other authority figures to reliance on peers, 
adolescents are still more likely than adults to make decisions that reflect a compliance with 
authority (Grisso et al., 2003). Relatedly, adolescents do not have a fully developed sense of self. 
Research shows that adolescents categorized as having a low sense of self score poorly on 
measures of objectivity, reasoning, maturity, and impulse control, which may explain why they 
sometimes make poor legal decisions (Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996). If a teenager with a 
developing sense of identity is accused of a transgression, s/he may feel the need to protect their 
identity as a person who is generally “good.” Thus, in the interrogation room, s/he may not even 
consider leaving as a viable option—both to not appear guilty and as a form of compliance with 
the interrogator. However, given enough time and pressure, teens may discard the goal of 
protecting their sense of identity in favor of escaping the situation. Often in an interrogation, 
juveniles, like adults, may see confession as the only route to escape. As juveniles with fragile 
identities and egos are shortsighted decision-makers, they may choose to confess for the reward of 
leaving the interrogation room and not comprehend the long-term legal consequences of giving a 
confession to a crime (Redlich & Goodman, 2003). 
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Juvenile Interrogations and Confessions 
Over the years, the Supreme Court has recognized that children may interpret the events of 
police questioning differently than adults (Gallegos v. Colorado, 1962; Haley v. Ohio, 1948; In re 
Gault, 1967; J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 2011). Even before Miranda in 1966, the Court had 
explicitly distrusted the confessions of juveniles and warned against the coercion of “lad[s] of 
tender years” (Haley v. Ohio, 1948, p. 599) during police interrogations. Immediately after 
Miranda, the Court held that juveniles must be afforded the same Fifth Amendment rights as adults 
and expressed concern about their vulnerability to false confession (In re Gault, 1967). Over a 
decade later, however, the Court refused to grant additional protections to juveniles when it 
decided that adult standards of voluntariness were sufficiently protective (Fare v. Michael C., 
1979). Applying this decision to the related, but distinct custody inquiry, the Court held that age 
and experience with police were not necessary characteristics for interrogators and trial courts to 
consider when determining custody (Yarborough v. Alvarado, 2004). In a recent near-reversal of 
the Yarborough decision, the Supreme Court held by a 5-4 margin that age is an objective factor 
that must be considered for purposes of custody (J.B.D. v. North Carolina, 2011). This decision 
echoed early concerns that children are more susceptible to coercion and have a limited 
understanding of the legal system.  
Adolescents in the Interrogation Room 
The Supreme Court’s decision in J.D.B. demonstrates an understanding that regarding a 
process of interrogation that was created for adults, the teenager’s psychosocial immaturity 
increases vulnerability to coercion. An abundance of research has shown that many adolescents 
lack adequate comprehension of important legal processes and terminology, especially Miranda 
warnings (Abramovitch, Peterson-Badali & Rohan, 1995; Feld, 2006; Grisso, 1980; Redlich, 
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Silverman & Steiner, 2003; Woolard, Cleary, Harvell & Chen, 2008; Zelle et al., 2015). Indeed, 
one study reported waiver rates of as high as 80% in 16-17-year-old suspects accused of felonies 
(Feld, 2006). Within this literature, a clear pattern has emerged: adolescents younger than 16 years 
display poorer comprehension and application of Miranda than do older adolescents and adults 
(e.g. Abramovitch et al., 1995). 
Waiving Miranda rights to silence and counsel subjects juveniles to police interrogation, 
during which they may display a heightened vulnerability to psychological interrogation tactics 
such as the presentation of false evidence and minimization tactics that imply leniency (e.g., 
Redlich & Goodman, 2003; for a review, see Owen-Kostelnik et al., 2006). Once in the 
interrogation room, and without constitutional protections, most juveniles are impaired by their 
susceptibility to social influence, deference to authority, suggestibility, and myopic decision-
making, all of which increase the risk of a false confession relative to adults (Redlich & Goodman, 
2003; Pimentel, Arndorfer & Malloy, 2015). The aforementioned vulnerabilities may be enhanced 
by the salience of social norms that demand everyday compliance with authority. In the 
interrogation room, this norm may manifest as a perception of restriction—or custody—that may 
be present to a greater extent in adolescents than in adults. Relatedly, research on known wrongful 
convictions confirm what psychologists have found in the laboratory: juveniles are 
overrepresented in the population of false confessors (Drizin & Leo, 2004).  
To summarize, adolescents are expected to knowingly and intelligently invoke or waive 
rights that they may not fully comprehend, after which they may undergo a guilt-presumptive 
interrogation that can increase the risks of false confession. In J.D.B., the landmark case on 
juvenile interrogation rights, the Court decided that age is indeed a factor that can influence 
whether a reasonable person feels free to leave (“a reasonable child subjected to police questioning 
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will sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would feel free to go”, J.D.B. v. 
North Carolina, 2011, p. 2403). With this ruling, the Court held that juveniles perceive custodial 
interrogation in a way that is fundamentally different from adults. One of the aims of the present 
studies is to test this hypothesis.  
The previous literature and U.S. Supreme Court decisions have focused on juvenile 
behavior and decision-making during interrogations but have not similarly examined how 
teenagers perceive these sessions as neutral observers. Experiment 1 of the present research 
examined how adolescents perceive potentially custodial interactions with police and whether the 
Miranda comprehension literature extends to perceptions of freedom during police questioning 
sessions. As a result of their lesser knowledge concerning Miranda and other legal rights, and a 
predisposition to submit to authority, I predicted that adolescents would perceive an even greater 
restriction on freedom to leave than adults.  
The Perspectives of Legal Observers 
Apart from age, it is important to know how legal professionals who make custody 
judgments for a living interpret the circumstances of a questioning session. Relative to actors, 
observers often possess unique information in the form of past experiences, observations, 
motivations, and frameworks that may influence the way they interpret the world around them 
(Watson, 1982). This may lead to a divergence in perceptions of custody between actors and 
observers—and even among different types of observers. For example, by virtue of their 
professional position and experience, police officers enter the interrogation room with a “real time” 
task to accomplish, which makes them differently oriented than judges who review and evaluate 
the situation post hoc. Knowledge of case details and past experiences may then influence 
detectives’ real-time custody decisions by influencing how they perceive the suspect, the situation, 
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and the types of questioning tactics they employ. Since both police and judges make consequential 
custody decisions, it is important to examine whether they agree in their determinations of custody 
with each other and, perhaps more importantly, with the reasonable lay person.  
Police Investigators 
“Police must make in-the-moment judgments as to when to administer Miranda 
warnings.” (J.D.B. vs. North Carolina, 2011, p. 2402) 
 
Police assess custody. As investigators duty bound to enforce the law and control crime, 
police face pressures to solve cases from supervisors, district attorneys, the public, and victims and 
their families. Questioning witnesses and suspects is an important part of investigation that may 
help police achieve this goal. But police questioning comes with an additional task for the 
interrogator. As the actors who must make a real-time assessment of custody, police 
contemporaneously question persons of interest and review the objective circumstances of the 
situation they have created to determine whether the protections triggered by the state of custody 
are necessary (Bang, et al., 2018; Miranda v. Arizona, 1966).  
Over the years, the U.S. Supreme Court has provided conflicting opinions about a police 
investigator’s ability to correctly determine custody for Miranda purposes. Some opinions assert 
confidence in their competence to evaluate the effects of relevant circumstances for purposes of 
custody (Yarborough v. Alvarado, 2004). Others concede that “police…will continue occasionally 
to have difficulty deciding exactly when a suspect has been taken into custody” (Berkemer v. 
McCarty, 1984, p. 441). Still others seem to distrust law enforcement in these matters: “Police 
officers are ill-equipped to pinch-hit for counsel, construing the murky and difficult questions of 
when ‘custody’ begins or whether a given unwarned statement will ultimately be held admissible” 
(Oregon v. Elstad, 1985, p. 316). Therefore, rather than imposing on police the burden of divining 
each individual’s potential vulnerabilities in the interrogation room, they are directed to use the 
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objective circumstances of the questioning situation and the reasonable person standard to 
determine custody (Berkemer v. McCarty, 1984). 
Police judgments of custody. Despite the Courts’ attempts to concretize the custody 
inquiry, the potential for ambiguity during interrogations is high. The Court itself acknowledges 
that objective and subjective circumstances are sometimes indistinguishable for the purposes of 
custody (“fair-minded jurists could disagree over whether Alvarado was in custody,” Yarborough 
v. Alvarado, 2004, p. 664). Without arrest as a custodial bright-line, the objective circumstances 
of a questioning session may be reasonably interpreted differently when viewed from different 
perspectives (Alceste et al., 2018). 
Scenarios that lend themselves to different interpretations, like custody, can bias the 
cognitive processes used to make determinations, especially when people hold pre-existing beliefs 
that they are motivated to maintain. In one study, for example, Ask, Rebelius & Granhag (2008) 
found that ambiguity facilitates motivated reasoning when interpreting investigative evidence. In 
this study, researchers instructed police trainees to evaluate DNA, photo, or witness evidence that 
was either compatible or incompatible with their initial belief in the suspect’s guilt. Results showed 
that participants were more likely to be critical of undesirable evidence that was incompatible with 
their initial beliefs—but only for eyewitness evidence, which is more conducive to subjective 
interpretation than more scientifically-grounded evidence like DNA.  
The results of Ask et al. (2008) may provide insight into police judgments of custody. 
During investigations, police make decisions about who to question based on the evidence 
collected. Thus, police may enter the interrogation room with the pre-existing belief that 
questioning a particular person is instrumental to solving the case. To an interrogator with these 
professional beliefs and goals, custody may be undesirable because of the popular assumption that 
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custodial protections are too restrictive—some have expressed concern that informing suspects of 
their right against self-incrimination is a “‘constitutional straitjacket’ on law enforcement” (Orozco 
v. Texas, 1969, p. 328), fearing that warned suspects will refuse to answer the interrogator’s 
questions and consequently that justice will not be done (Boetig, Vinson & Weidel, 2006; Cassell, 
1996; Inbau & Reid, 1967; Miranda v. Arizona, 1966). The ambiguity associated with custody 
may further exacerbate this tendency, as in Ask et al. (2008). 
Just as police enter an interrogation room with a hypothesis about the suspect’s 
involvement in the crime, so too do they possess knowledge about the wide range of interviewing 
and interrogation processes, noncustodial and custodial alike. As a result of their frequent exposure 
to various situations, such as arrest, detention, and the use of handcuffs, police may become 
desensitized to factors that others may consider restrictive (e.g., a closed interrogation room door).  
When police drive a subject to the police station for questioning, that subject may feel compelled 
to oblige and to remain for the entirety of the questioning. Yet the detective may interpret the 
subject’s acquiescence as an indication of voluntariness and believe that s/he is free to leave. In 
other words, factors that may seem restrictive to an average citizen may appear noncustodial to a 
police officer because interrogators’ experience with custody makes them acutely aware of just 
how restrictive custody can be. 
Trial Judges 
“Once the scene is set and the players’ lines and actions are reconstructed, the court must 
apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate inquiry.” (Thompson v. Keohane, 1995, p. 
113) 
 
As the gatekeepers of confession evidence, judges must rule at a pretrial hearing whether 
an interrogation was custodial or not, whether the suspect was afforded the necessary protections, 
and thus whether the statement taken was voluntary and hence admissible into evidence (U.S. 
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Const. amend. XIV). Miranda may facilitate judges’ custody decisions because the voluntariness 
of a single waiver is easier to evaluate than hours-long interrogations (Malone, 1986). But legal 
scholars argue that this shortcut has effectively “shifted the legal inquiry from whether the 
confession was voluntarily given to whether Miranda rights were voluntarily waived” (p. 377). 
The modeling of custody as an objective test may have implications for how judges view custody 
by presenting the assumption that there is a “correct” legal decision in every custody inquiry. 
The motivation to be impartial. The essential role of an impartial gatekeeper necessitates 
a different mental state than that of an investigator. Instead of the motivation to solve a case, judges 
are empowered to make decisions that are impartial, consistent with precedent, and legally correct 
(Guide to Judiciary Policy, 2014).  Judges who stray too far from the law and prior interpretations 
of that law risk the punishing consequence of having their decisions appealed and overturned 
(Vidmar, 2011).  
Research on motivated cognition shows that individuals with a motivation to be accurate 
engage in more complex, more deliberate, and deeper processing of information than those driven 
by directional goals (Kunda, 1990). In laboratory experiments, the motivation to be accurate is 
frequently operationalized by informing participants that they will have to publicly defend their 
judgments—and are hence accountable to those decisions (e.g. Tetlock, 1985).Under these 
circumstances, participants rely less on stereotypes and mental shortcuts, like the fundamental 
attribution error, and use more complex decision-making strategies than those who do not expect 
to be held accountable or have other motivations (Chaiken, 1980; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; 
Freund, Kruglanski, & Shpitzajzen, 1985, Tetlock, 1985).  
In a study of how motivations and first impressions influence guilt judgments, participants 
either first read pro-defendant information, followed by anti-defendant information, or vise-versa 
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(Tetlock, 1983). Participants were also either informed that they would be held accountable for 
their judgments by having to justify their decision to the experimenter (accuracy motivation) or 
that their judgment would be confidential (control). Results showed that control participants relied 
on primacy effects such that they rendered a verdict in accordance with the information they 
learned first. However, participants who were motivated to make the correct decision resisted the 
influence of evidence order and generally recalled more information about the case. Much like the 
participants in studies on the motivation to be accurate, judges are held accountable for their 
decisions and must defend them with clear argumentation.  
Unfortunately, accuracy-motivated reasoning is not a cure against all bias. Accuracy-
driven participants still rely on availability heuristics and exhibit a hindsight bias (Lord, Lepper & 
Preston, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Perhaps due to individuals’ lack of awareness of their 
own mental processes, the tendency to attribute causality to more visually salient actors, for 
example, also persists in the face of a motivation to be accurate (Lassiter, Munhall, Geers, Weiland 
& Handley, 2001; Wilson & Brekke, 1994). Accuracy motivations aside, trial judges are still on 
the “observer” side of the attribution process. In addition to being differently motivated than 
police, judges may have more extensive knowledge of the factors that influence custody and likely 
have different experiences judging custody than police do.  
Experiences with and knowledge of custody. Compared to police officers, who 
frequently question subjects in a variety of custodial and noncustodial settings, judges evaluate a 
smaller sample of more advanced interviews and interrogations during suppression hearings. Due 
to the nature of these hearings, they are often presented with ambiguous cases in which prosecutors 
and police argue that the defendant was free to leave, while defense attorneys argue that the 
defendant was in custody. For this reason, judges use the totality of the objective circumstances 
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approach in making this decision. Aiming to make an accurate assessment, and in keeping with 
the law, judges may attend to different types of information than other observers, especially the 
types of objective circumstances that higher courts have identified in the custody case law. For 
instance, where some may reason that questioning a suspect in his or her own home constitutes a 
noncustodial situation, almost by definition, judges may point to Orozco v. Texas (1969) and rule 
that suspects may still require legal protections in their own home. 
To sum up, the present research addressed two sets of questions. The first concerned the 
question of whether juveniles perceive custodial and noncustodial situations in the same way that 
adults do or whether they are inclined by youth to perceive less freedom regardless of the 
surrounding circumstances. The second study tested police officers and judges, two legally 
relevant populations, whose custody judgements have not previously been studied, despite their 
pivotal roles at different phases of the custody inquiry. These groups were compared to lay adults. 
Due to their different backgrounds, experiences, knowledge, and motivations, I predicted that 
police officers would exhibit a greater tendency than judges to view ambiguous questioning 
sessions as less custodial.  
Study 1 
Study 1 extended the work of Alceste et al. (2018) by comparing the custody perceptions 
of lay adults and adolescents using stimulus videos of interviews and interrogations previously 
conducted in the laboratory. In Alceste et al., interviews embodied traditionally noncustodial 
objective circumstances, while interrogations contained more restrictive and custodial factors. 
Though actors did not feel free to leave in either type of session, observers believed that actors 
were freer and felt freer to leave in interviews than in interrogations—as assumed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  
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In light of the many ways described earlier in which juveniles exhibit “immaturity of 
judgment,” resulting in an increased risk of false confessions, this study aimed to examine whether 
the actor-observer bias previously found extends to juvenile observers or whether their lesser 
comprehension of Miranda and greater deference to adult authority translates into a tendency to 
perceive restriction even in noncustodial settings.  
Method 
Design. Following previous research showing that Miranda comprehension varies 
significantly between adults and adolescents, the design of this study followed a 2 (interview vs. 
interrogation) x 2 (observer: lay adult vs. adolescent) between-subjects factorial design. An a 
priori power analysis showed that a total N of 351 observers would be sufficient to detect a small-
to-medium effect size of Cohen’s f = 0.15 with 80% power (approximately n = 88 per cell). As in 
Alceste et al., observers watched videos of interviews and interrogations collected during a live 
laboratory experiment, during which participants were led to believe that a theft had occurred; they 
were then questioned about it. Each participant observer was randomly assigned to watch one 
video of either an interview or an interrogation. 
Participants. In total, 394 participants completed Study 1 (153 adolescents; 241 adults).  
Adolescents. I recruited as juvenile observers high school students from two populations: 
(1) a large New York State high school, and (2) students who participated in a Psychology and 
Neuroscience summer program at Yale University in the summer of 20181. For both populations, 
2,058 parents were contacted by school administrators and asked to indicate if they wish to opt 
their child out of the procedure (only 10 parents exercised this option). Therefore, 2,048 students 
                                                          
1 I ran a mixed ANOVA on the continuous measures and found no significant difference between these two 
populations, psbonf > .13. However, there was a significant difference between the first round of New York high school 
students (Spring 2018, n = 82) and the second (Spring 2019, n = 50), F (2, 116) = 6.83, p = .002, η2 = .10, even though 
they are from the same high school. This difference is discussed in the General Discussion.  
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with parental consent were invited to participate. A total of 404 students at least started the 
experiment (19.73% response rate), but after excluding those who did not complete the study and 
those who failed manipulation and instruction checks (described in the following section), the final 
sample consisted of 153 adolescent participants. In this sample, participants were 15.30 years old 
on average (SD = 1.24), 66.00% of the sample was female (32.0% male; 2.0% other), 45.80% were 
freshmen, 17.0% were sophomores, 22.90% were juniors, and 14.40% were seniors. The sample 
was mostly White (69.90%), followed by Asian (11.80%), Hispanic (8.50%), other (7.20%), and 
Black (.70%, n = 1).  
Lay adults. A sample of 238 lay adults were recruited and paid $1.25 through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an economical and rapid way to collect high-quality data (see 
Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). After excluding participants for failing at least one 
manipulation check and not complying with at least three of the four key instructions, the final 
MTurk sample was 196 participants. To increase the demographic representativeness of the lay 
sample, I also recruited 52 (21.85%) undergraduates from a public university who completed the 
study in exchange for course credit. After the same exclusions were applied to this sample, the 
final count was 45 undergraduate students. The mean age for this sample was 35.22 years (SD = 
13.41), the sample was 61.40% female (38.20% male; n = 1 other), and was mostly White 
(62.70%), followed by Black (14.10%), Hispanic (13.30%), Asian (7.10%), and other (2.50%) 
(missing n = 1). For the MTurk sample, 37.80% of participants had a high school education, 52.0% 
had a Bachelor’s degree, 6.10% had a Master’s degree, 1.50% had a professional degree, and 
2.60% had a PhD. Logically, all but six participants in the student sample reported having a high 
school education, as they are currently enrolled in college (of those six, 3 reported having a 
Bachelor’s degree and 3 reported having a PhD). 
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 Materials and procedure. After providing online informed assent (minors) or consent 
(adults), observers read the following a brief description of what they would see and the context 
in which it had occurred:  
“During a psychology study at a university, a participant’s wallet went missing. A security 
guard from the Public Safety office was sent to the laboratory to investigate. What you will 
watch now is a video of the questioning that took place. The person being questioned is 
another participant in the psychology study who was present when the victim noticed that 
her wallet was missing.”   
Observers were randomly assigned to watch one of the 57 stimulus videos from Alceste et 
al. (2018). Purportedly as part of a theft investigation, questioning sessions involved a college 
student participant and a research assistant who played the role of a campus security guard. 
Sessions followed the Reid Technique training and manual guidelines for interviews and 
interrogations—about which the security guard was highly knowledgeable (Inbau et al., 2013). 
Interviews were conducted with the door open and with the experimenter present. In contrast, 
interrogations were conducted with the security guard and actor alone in the room with the door 
closed. No actors were physically restrained or otherwise prohibited from leaving the room. 
Interviews. Actors were questioned about the missing wallet according to the non-
accusatory “Behavioral Analysis Interview” (Inbau et al., 2013). Interviews consisted of open-
ended questions and directives (e.g. “Walk me through step-by-step what happened here”) and 
direct questions (e.g. “Let me ask you straight out: did you take this girl’s wallet?”), as well as 
specific behavior-provoking questions recommended in the Reid Technique (e.g. “What do you 
think should happen to the person who took the wallet?”). The average duration of interviews was 
7.40 minutes (M = 443.71 seconds, SD = 80.37). 
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Interrogations. In contrast, interrogations opened with a direct accusation (“Based on what 
I’ve seen and heard, I know you took this girl’s wallet. That much is clear. What I’m trying to 
figure out is why”), followed by the development of themes designed to minimize the moral 
seriousness of the theft (e.g., “I don’t believe you planned to take this girl’s wallet;” Inbau et al., 
2013). Actors’ objections and denials were interrupted. Interrogations lasted on average 9.85 
minutes (M = 591.06 seconds, SD = 118.79). 
Dependent measures. After the video, observers answered a series of dichotomous and 
continuous rating questions. Specifically, they indicated (1) whether and to what extent the actor 
was free to leave, (2) whether and to what extent the actor felt free to leave, and finally (3) whether 
and to what extent they would personally feel free to leave during the questioning. From now on, 
these three questions are referred to as objective, subjective, and perspective-taking questions, 
respectively. For each measure, participants made a yes/no objective determination and a 
continuous subjective judgment, from 1 (not free at all) to 10 (totally free). 
Manipulation/instruction checks and exploratory measures. Following Alceste et al. 
(2018), observers rendered judgments as to the actor’s guilt or innocence and also, as a 
manipulation check, whether they thought the actor was being questioned as a witness or a suspect. 
Additionally, participants indicated whether the security guard accused the subject of stealing the 
wallet, whether the door to the room was open or closed, whether there was a third person in the 
room, and whether the subject was ever physically restrained. Correct responses to the first three 
questions vary with questioning type, but the correct answer to the fourth question was always 
“no.” Participants were not excluded based on their responses to these questions, as responses may 
be useful in interpreting the results of the main dependent measures (e.g. participants who watch 
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the interview and perceive restriction may misremember that the security guard accused the subject 
of stealing).  
Participants were also asked in an open-ended question why they thought the actor stayed 
in the room during the questioning. By reading through all responses, I determined that most 
reasons fell into one or more of four categories. I used a word-search coding technique to record 
the presence or absence of each of the following types of reasons for each response. First, 
participants reported that the subject stayed in the room for a tactical reason—that is, they believed 
that (1) leaving or asking permission to leave would make them appear suspicious or guilty, and/or 
(2) they stayed in order to prove their innocence to the security guard. The keywords I searched 
for that indicated a tactical reason for staying were: suspicion, suspicious, suspect[ed], guilty, 
innocent, [prove] innocence, trouble, avoid, took [the wallet], hide[ing], accuse[d], and 
consequence. Second, participants reported that the subject was inhibited by the presence of an 
authority figure. Keywords associated with this category were: authority [figure], police, security, 
pressure, power, obey, choice, comply, compliant, intimidate, obligation, respect/disrespect. 
Third, some participants explained that the subject stayed in the room because they were having 
an emotional response. Keywords associated with the emotional response category were: fear, 
afraid, nervous, anxious, scared, uncomfortable. Finally, participants indicated the subject stayed 
because they wanted to help the investigation. Keywords searched for the “help” category were: 
help[ful], cooperate, find the truth, find the wallet.  
After completing the word-search coding, I reviewed all participants’ responses and 
adjusted the coding to include responses that fit into each category but did not include a keyword 
(e.g. “Because she was told to do so” references the power of the authority figure without using 
any keywords) or exclude responses that contained a keyword for one category but fit into a 
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different category (e.g. “They felt obligated to answer all questions so that they could show their 
innocence” contains “obligated”, which is an authority word, but clearly represents a tactical 
response). 
At the close of the questionnaire, participants provided various demographic 
characteristics, such as gender, age, and education (grade level for high school participants). 
Importantly, observers indicated that they maximized their web browser, they completed the study 
in a single session without stopping, they did not use a search engine during the study, and they 
did not take notes. For MTurkers, this comprised an honesty check, as participants were paid 
regardless of their level of compliance. Participants who did not comply with at least three of the 
four instructions were excluded from analyses.  
Hypotheses 
H1: Consistent with literatures on Miranda comprehension and deference to adult 
authority, I predicted a main effect of observer type such that adolescents would perceive more 
restriction in questioning sessions than adults.  
H2: Consistent with Alceste et al. (2018), I predicted a main effect of questioning type 
such that interrogations would be judged as more custodial than interviews.  
H3: For the repeated measures factor of question type, I predicted that the perspective-
taking question (“How free would you feel?”) would result in greater judgments of custody than 
the questions regarding the subject’s objective state and subjective feelings of custody. 
Results 
 Binary custody judgments. Table 1 shows the percentages of participants per condition 
who responded “yes” for each of the three key questions. Across all question types, adolescents 
responded “no” (i.e., was not, did not feel, would not feel free to leave) more often than adults, 
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indicating that they were more likely to perceive restriction vs. freedom regardless of condition. 
Interrogations also yielded greater perceptions of restriction (again, more “no” votes) than 
interviews. On average, both types of participants displayed a similar pattern for question type 
across condition: most believed the subject in the video was not free to leave, but that the subject’s 
feeling of restriction exceeded his/her objective restriction; participants also reported that they 
believed they would feel freer than the subject felt if they were the ones in the subject’s position.  
 Dichotomous measures of freedom (yes—no). I submitted the dichotomous objective, 
subjective, and perspective-taking judgments of freedom to logistic regression analyses with 
participant type and condition as the categorical factors. 
 Objective: Was the person being questioned free to leave? This logistic regression model 
was significant, χ2 (390) = 23.89, p < .001, and explained 7.80% of the variance (Nagelkerke R2). 
Compared to adults, adolescents were 2.08 times more likely to report that the person being 
questioned was not free to leave (OR = 2.08; 95% CI for the estimate [0.14, 1.32]; p = .015). 
Additionally, compared to those who watched an interview, participants who watched an 
interrogation were 1.77 times more likely to indicate that the person was not free to leave (OR = 
1.77; 95% CI [0.054, 1.09]; p = .03). There were no significant interactions.  
Subjective: Did the person being questioned feel free to leave? This model was also 
significant, χ2 (390) = 12.61, p = .006, and explained 5.60% of the variance in participants’ 
responses (Nagelkerke R2). Again, participant type was a significant predictor—adolescents were 
5.14 times more likely to believe the person did not feel free to leave than adults (OR = 5.14; 95% 
CI [0.54, 2.73]; p = .003). Participants who watched an interrogation were 2.09 times more likely 
to report that the person did not feel free than those who watched an interview (OR = 2.09; 95% 
CI [0.049, 1.43]; p = .036). There was an interaction between participant type and condition such 
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that adults and adolescents did not differ in their perceptions of subjective freedom in the 
interrogation condition (12.40% vs. 12.82%, respectively), but they did differ in the interview 
condition, where adults were more likely than adolescents to perceive subjective freedom (22.69% 
vs. 5.41%, respectively) (OR = 0.19; 95% CI [-3.06, -0.28]; p = .019).  
Perspective-taking: Would you feel free to leave? This third regression model was also 
significant, χ2 (390) = 9.22, p = .026, and explained 3.40% of the variance in the dependent 
measure. Here, only participant type was significant (OR = 2.25; 95% CI [0.12, 1.51]; p = .022). 
Overall, adolescents were significantly more likely than adults to indicate that they would not feel 
free to leave if they were in the subject’s position. 
Continuous measures of freedom. In addition to rendering dichotomous judgments of 
freedom, participants were asked to what extent the subject of the questioning was free to leave 
(objective) and felt free to leave (subjective), as well as to rate how free they themselves would 
feel if they were in that situation (1 = not free at all, 10 = totally free). These three continuous 
measures of perceived freedom were highly intercorrelated with each other (see Table 2 for 
Pearson r’s).  
Continuous measures of perceptions of freedom were submitted to a 2 (condition: interview 
vs. interrogation) x 2 (observer: lay adult vs. adolescent) x 3 (question type: objective vs. subjective 
vs. perspective-taking) mixed ANOVA, with question type as a repeated measures factor (see 
Table 3 for cell means, standard deviations, and sample sizes). After applying a Greenhouse-Geiser 
correction for a violation of the sphericity assumption, three main effects were found—and no 
significant interactions (all psinteraction > .15). First, as predicted, a main effect of participant type 
indicated that adolescents (M = 3.68, SD = 1.67) perceived significantly less freedom across 
conditions and question types than adults (M = 4.41, SD = 2.42), F (1, 346) = 9.27, p = .003, η2 
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=.026. Also as predicted, a main effect of condition indicated that participants perceived more 
freedom in interviews (M = 4.45, SD = 2.21) than in interrogations (M = 3.82, SD = 2.13), F (1, 
346) = 7.14, p = .008, η2 =.02.  
Finally, a main effect was found for the repeated measures variable of question type, F 
(1.96, 678.06) = 86.42, p < .001, η2 = .198. Post-hoc comparisons showed that all three question 
types (Mobjective = 5.27, SD = 2.84; Msubjective = 3.34, SD = 2.26; and Mperspective-taking = 3.91, SD = 
2.89) were significantly different from each other (all pbonf < .001). Specifically, the objective 
question yielded a greater perception of freedom than both the subjective question (Mdiff = 1.93, 
SE = .148, t = 13.06) and the perspective-taking question (Mdiff = 1.37, SE = .14, t = 9.81). The 
subjective question yielded significantly lower perceptions of freedom than the perspective-taking 
question (Mdiff = -.57, SE = .13, t = -4.35). Contrary to my hypothesis that the perspective-taking 
question would yield the greatest perception of restriction, participants believed the subject felt 
less free than s/he actually was but that they themselves would feel freer than the actor, falling 
somewhere in between these two scores. 
Secondary measures and manipulation checks. Secondary analyses were conducted to 
make additional comparisons for which no formal hypotheses were stated (e.g., pertaining to age 
of adolescents). Additional measures included open-ended explanations for the target subject’s 
behavior, perceptions of the guard’s belief in guilt, perceptions of the subject’s guilt, and four 
factual manipulation check questions pertaining to the interview vs. interrogation condition. 
Age. The adolescent participants in this sample were 14 years old (n = 47), followed by 15 
(n = 38), 16 (n = 32), and 17 (n = 25); there were also three 13-year-olds, four 18-year-olds, and 
one 19-year-old. Due to the apparent pattern in the Miranda comprehension literature that younger 
adolescents (those 15 and younger) have more difficulty with Miranda warnings than older 
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adolescents (e.g. Abramovitch et al., 1995), there was reason to believe that age would be a 
significant predictor of perceptions of freedom within the adolescent group of participants. I ran 
linear regressions for the continuous dependent measures and logistic regressions for the binary 
measures, and no regression model returned a significant effect for age (all ps > .08). 
Open-ended responses. After the main dependent measures, we asked, “Why do you think 
the person stayed in the room during questioning?” On average, participants used 27.62 words to 
answer this question (SD = 22.15, median = 23, min = 1, max = 201). Interestingly, adolescents 
provided significantly longer responses (M = 33.59 words, SD = 25.76) than adults (M = 23.87, 
SD = 18.66), t (246.60) = 4.01, p < .001, d = .43 (95% CI [.23, .63]).  
Overall, tactical reasons were by far the most predominant (62.37%), followed by authority 
(33.93%), helping (13.88%), and emotion (7.97%). Adolescents (69.80%) were significantly more 
likely than adults (57.30%) to cite a tactical explanation χ2 (1, N = 388) = 6.07, p = .014. In contrast, 
adults (19.70%) were more likely than adolescents (4.70%) to indicate that the subject stayed 
because they were trying to help, χ2 (1, N = 389) = 17.34, p < .001. On average, 7.90% of 
participants cited emotion and 33.50% cited the authority figure, but participant type had no 
significant effect on these two categories, ps > .13. 
Security guard’s beliefs about guilt. After the main dependent measures, participants 
completed manipulation checks. I tested these measures with chi-squares for each observer group 
to examine whether they perceived the underlying and objective differences between interviews 
and interrogations. Participants indicated whether the security guard in the video believed that the 
subject was guilty or innocent. In the interrogation videos, the guard made it abundantly clear that 
he believed the subject was responsible for the theft, but in the interviews, the guard merely treated 
the subject as a witness. Both adolescents and adults reported that the guard thought the subject 
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was more likely to be guilty in the interrogation condition (adolescent: 89.60%; adults: 86.00%) 
than in the interview condition,  χadolescents
2 (1, N = 151) = 4.33, p = .038; χadults
2 (1, N = 240) = 8.34, 
p = .004. Despite this significant difference, a majority of both adolescents (77.0%) and adults 
(70.60%) who watched an information-gathering interview still believed the security guard 
thought the subject was guilty.  
Guilt. Participants also indicated whether they thought the subject of the questioning was 
guilty or innocent of taking the wallet. Even though the majority of participants reported that the 
guard thought the subject was guilty (overall 80.31%), participants largely maintained a 
presumption of innocence; only 30.69% of all participants perceived the subject to be guilty. 
Adolescents were significantly more likely to report that subjects in interrogations were guilty 
(41.60%) than were those in interviews (26.0%), χ2 (1, N = 150) = 4.03, p = .045. This difference 
did not exist among adults, who largely displayed an innocence bias when observing both 
interviews (only 28.60% indicated the subject was guilty vs. 71.40% innocent) and interrogations 
(28.70% guilty vs. 71.30% innocent), χ2 (1, N = 241) < .001, p = .98. 
Accusations. Across participant samples and conditions, 72.59% of participants accurately 
reported that the security guard accused the subject of the theft in the interrogation, but not in the 
interview. In the adolescent group, 61.60% of those who watched an interview correctly indicated 
that the guard did not accuse the subject (though around a quarter [24.7%] of these adolescents 
reported that they did not know), and 70.90% of those who watched an interrogation correctly 
indicated that he did (only 15.20% said they did not know), χ2 (2, N = 152) = 53.75, p < .001. 
Likewise, adults were more likely to correctly report that the guard did not accuse the subject in 
an interview (73.10%; 7.60% reported not knowing), and correctly reported that he did accuse the 
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subject in an interrogation (80.30%; 5.70% reported not knowing), χ2 (2, N = 241) = 93.83, p < 
.001.  
Status of the door. Across conditions, 66.24% of both adolescents and adults correctly 
reported that the door to the room was open in interviews and closed in interrogations. Adolescents 
who watched an interview remembered that the door was open (60.30%, though 23.30% said they 
did not know), and those who watched an interrogation remembered that the door was closed 
(72.20%; 17.70% said they did not know), χ2 (2, N = 152) = 54.41, p < .001. Adults who watched 
an interview remembered that the door was open (57.10%), but a surprising percentage incorrectly 
remembered that the door was closed (31.9%). Of those adults who watched an interrogation, 
75.40% correctly remembered that the door was closed (only 9.0% reported that it was open), χ2 
(2, N = 241) = 64.66, p < .001.  
Third person in the room. There was a third person in the room in the interview videos—
a research assistant who the subject could have reasonably viewed as an ally—but not in the 
interrogations. Overall, 89.85% of participants answered this question correctly. Adolescents who 
watched an interview correctly remembered the third person in the room (89.20%; 5.40% did not 
know); those who watched an interrogation also correctly remembered that the subject was alone 
with the guard (84.80%; 8.90% did not know), χ2 (2, N = 153) = 109.10, p < .001. Adults who 
watched an interview correctly remembered the third person (93.30%; 1.70% did not know), and 
those who watched an interrogation correctly remembered that there was no third person (90.20%; 
4.9% did not know), χ2 (2, N = 241) = 189.50, p < .001. 
Physically restrained. Finally, participants were asked to recall whether the subject in the 
video was physically restrained—in reality, no subject was restrained in any way. In total, 93.65% 
of both adolescents and adults correctly reported this objective factor. Adolescents remembered 
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that subjects in interviews (90.50%; 5.40% did not know) and interrogations (84.80%; 11.40% did 
not know) were not physically restrained, χ2 (2, N = 153) = 1.76, p = .41. Adults similarly correctly 
remembered that subjects in interviews (99.20%; n = 1 did not know) and interrogations (95.90%; 
n = 1 did not know) were not restrained, χ2 (2, N = 241) = 3.97, p = .14. 
Summary. This study replicated the observer results in Alceste et al. (2018)—namely that 
observers report that interrogations are more custodial than interviews.  Consistent with previous 
research on immaturity of judgment and Miranda comprehension, adolescents perceived more 
restriction than adults in response to viewing both the interview and interrogation videos. Contrary 
to the Miranda literature, age was not a significant predictor of adolescents’ perceptions of 
freedom. To summarize the results of the secondary measures and manipulation checks, both 
adolescents and adults differentiated between interviews and interrogations in terms of the 
objective circumstances of the questioning, which lends even more strength to the finding that 
adolescents perceived less freedom overall than adults, regardless of questioning session type. 
Interestingly, adults and adolescents did differ significantly with regard to their reasoning for why 
the subject stayed in the room. 
Study 2 
Study 2 compared lay adult perceptions of custody to those of police officers and trial 
judges using written vignettes that described both a crime and the questioning of a suspect. Three 
vignettes were created that depicted either low, ambiguous, or high custody questioning sessions 
using objective factors cited in case law as either indicative of freedom (e.g., a “free to leave” 
warning in the low custody vignette, as in California v. Beheler, 1983) or custody (e.g., a direct 
accusation in the high custody vignette, as in Thompson v. Keohane, 1995). Unlike the low and 
high custody vignettes, the ambiguous scenario consisted of both types of objective factors 
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(Appendix). By presenting participants with one of three levels of custody, Study 2 aimed to 
determine if the U.S. Supreme Court’s delineation between custodial and noncustodial factors 
indeed elicits differing perceptions of custody among legal and non-legal observers. Specifically, 
this study assessed whether legal professionals are in agreement with regards to custody, and 
importantly, how their perceptions compare to those of laypeople. As in Study 1, this study also 
examined whether participants distinguish between objective custody (was the suspect free to 
leave) and a suspect’s subjective feelings of freedom (did the suspect feel free to leave?).  
A secondary objective was to vary crime severity. Seldom are confessions and other 
evidence evaluated independently but rather in the context of a whole investigation. In a study of 
the cognitive processes associated with perceptions of confessions, Greenspan and Scurich (2016) 
found that police interrogations that led to a confession were judged to be less coercive than those 
that did not. One mechanism for this finding is known as coherence-based reasoning—reasoning 
is an integrated process by which the evaluation of evidence leads to a desired conclusion, which 
is then used to justify the interpretation of the evidence. In other words, the ends justify the means. 
This study is also consistent with other work demonstrating that strong contextual cues can bias 
forensic judgments throughout the criminal justice system (see Kassin, Dror, & Kukucka, 2013). 
Saks et al. (2003) noted that the resulting non-independence among items of evidence can create 
an “investigative echo chamber.” Simon (2011) notes that coherence-based reasoning promotes 
false corroboration among different witnesses, resulting in trials that are limited in their diagnostic 
value. 
To extend Greenspan and Scurich’s findings to custody, the current study examined how 
police and trial judges view custody in the context of high- and low-severity crimes. I predicted 
that participants who read about questioning sessions within the context of a high stakes murder 
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investigation would judge the questioning as less custodial than those who read the same 
descriptions in the context of a nonviolent burglary.  
Method 
Participants each read a description of one of three suspects being questioned in the context 
of a crime. The design of this study follows a 3 (subject: police vs. judge vs. lay adult) x 2 (crime 
severity: high vs. low) x 3 (vignette: low custody vs. ambiguous vs. high custody) between-
subjects factorial design. An a priori power analysis shows that a total N of 769 observers would 
be sufficient to detect a small effect size (Cohen’s f = .125) with 80% power (n = 43 per cell).  
Participants. In total, 647 participants completed Study 2 (219 judges; 223 law 
enforcement officers; 205 lay adults). 
Judges. Judges were recruited via a subscription to the American Bench, a directory 
containing the biographical and contact information of more than 20,000 judges across the U.S., 
including the email addresses of 5,709 members. Based on information from a previous user that 
the response rate tends to be approximately 7%, I randomly selected 4,535 judges (7% of this 
sample = 317 judges) to receive a recruitment email containing an explanation of the study and a 
link to participate. One week later, after a number of emails were rejected due to incorrect or 
inactive email addresses, I selected another random sample of 350 judges. After removing 
defective email addresses and judges who indicated that they had already completed the study or 
had no interest in participating, I used an email marketing service to send a reminder to 4,698 of 
the judges previously contacted. This reminder email was successfully sent to 4,321 judges.  
In total, 322 judges clicked on the link to the experiment and read the informed consent 
page. Of those, 265 completed the study in its entirety, though 46 failed at least one manipulation 
check and were excluded from analyses. The final judicial sample consisted of 219 judges (64.90% 
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male, 23.30% female, 1.40% other, 5.90% missing; 80.80% were White, 5.0% Black, 3.70% 
Hispanic, 1.80% Asian, 1.80% other, 6.80% missing). The average age of this sample was 59.17 
years (SD = 7.71, median = 60, min = 37, max = 82). All but six judges who reported their education 
had a professional degree (one selected “some college”, three selected “college graduate”, two 
selected “Master’s degree”, 14 declined to respond). On average, these respondents served on 
321.70 criminal trials (SD = 1,039.00; median = 100; min = 0, max = 10,000).  
Police. Police were recruited via a listserv of law enforcement officers who have undergone 
training with Wicklander-Zulawski & Associates, Inc. (W-Z), an organization that offers 
interrogation consulting and training in the private and public sectors. A random sample of 4,708 
law enforcement officers were recruited by W-Z and received a reminder email from the company 
three days after the initial inquiry. One week and a half later, an additional random sample of 8,463 
law enforcement officers received the same recruitment email and link to the survey, with a 
reminder email three days later. Of the 13,171 emails sent, 310 officers opened the link to the 
survey and 257 completed the study. Thirty-four selected an incorrect response for at least one 
manipulation check question and thus were excluded from analyses.  
The final law enforcement sample consisted of 223 police officers, most of whom were 
male (83.0%; 9.40% female; 1.8% other; 5.8% missing) and White (83.0%). Other races were not 
well-represented (all others <3.1%; 7.20% missing). The average age of this sample was 48.72 
years (SD = 8.84, median = 48.00, min = 23, max = 75). The majority were college graduates 
(40.40%), 24.70% reported having some college experience, 20.60% reported having a Master’s 
degree, 6.30% reported having a high school degree, and 1.8% (n = 4) reported having a PhD or 
professional degree (6.30% missing). On average, police estimated to have conducted 715 suspect 
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interviews (SD = 1,104.00, median = 350.0, min = 0, max = 10,000) and have been employed in 
law enforcement an average of 23.22 years (SD = 8.52, median = 23.0, min = 3.0, max = 50.0). 
Laypeople. A total of 232 lay adults were recruited and paid $0.20 through Amazon MTurk 
(the median completion time for this study was only 4.80 minutes). Thirty-two respondents were 
excluded for failing an attention check (described in a later section) and an additional 27 were 
excluded for failing at least one manipulation check. After exclusions, the final MTurk sample was 
173 participants. To increase the demographic representativeness of the lay sample, an additional 
75 undergraduate participants were recruited from a public university. Student participants 
completed the study in exchange for course credit. Only 68 of the 75 students provided information 
on the survey; of those 68, 12 failed at least one manipulation check and 24 failed the attention 
check. After exclusions, the undergraduate sample included 32 participants (15.61% of the final 
sample). Altogether, the final layperson sample for Study 2 included 205 lay adults. 
This sample consisted mostly of female participants (64.40%; 35.10% male; n = 1 missing) 
who identified as White (70.70%); 10.70% were Hispanic, 8.30% were Black, 5.90% were Asian, 
and 3.90% identified as other (n = 1 missing). The average age of this sample was 38.23 years (SD 
= 13.89, median = 37, min = 18, max = 81), and the majority of participants had completed some 
high school (50.70%); 38.0% indicated that they had a Bachelor’s degree, 8.80% indicated that 
they had a Master’s degree, and 2 participants each reported having a professional degree or a PhD 
(n = 1 missing). 
 Pilot testing. Stimulus vignettes were written using factors that the courts had previously 
used to determine what constitutes custody. To ensure that vignettes represented low, ambiguous, 
and high levels of custody, vignettes were pilot tested with a total of 512 lay participants from 
MTurk. In addition to four rounds of pilot testing, a Fordham Law Criminal Procedure professor 
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independently categorized each vignette as low, ambiguous, and high custody, and confirmed my 
classifications of the vignettes2.  
Study materials and procedure. Participants were first asked to provide informed 
consent. By random assignment, they were then presented with description of one of two crimes 
(home burglary that did or did not result in a murder) and one of the three types of interrogations 
involving a person of interest (low custody, ambiguous, or high custody).In total, each vignette 
was between 184 and 189 words in length. 
Dependent measures. After reading the crime description and vignette, participants 
answered the same three objective, subjective, and perspective-taking questions  as in Study 1: (1) 
whether and how free the suspect was to leave during questioning, (2) whether and how free he 
felt to leave, and (3) whether and how free the participant him/herself would feel in the suspect’s 
position. Next, participants answered manipulation check questions regarding the nature of the 
crime, which items were stolen from the home, and the length of each questioning session. 
Participants who incorrectly identified the crime committed, did not correctly identify at least one 
of the two items stolen from the home, and/or incorrectly identified the duration of the questioning 
were excluded from analyses.  
Judges and police (but not laypeople) also provided a definition of the reasonable person 
standard for exploratory analyses (“The courts have defined custody as a situation in which a 
reasonable person would feel that he or she is not free to leave.  How would you define ‘reasonable 
person’ for the purpose of this definition?”). By reading the definitions provided, I determined that 
most reasons fell into one or more of four categories. Using a similar word-search coding technique 
as in Study 1, I recorded the presence or absence of each of the following types of definitions of 
                                                          
2 Details of pilot testing are available upon request. 
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the reasonable person. First, I searched for keywords related to intelligence: intelligent[ce], 
intellect, IQ, smart, education. Second, I searched for keywords related to the idea that the 
reasonable person is an average person or has average characteristics: typical, common, normal, 
average, ordinary, plain, common sense, majority. Third, I searched for keywords associated with 
mental stability: sound mind, sane, sober, mental health/illness, mental state, drunk, drugs, 
understanding, judgment, sensibility, faculties, state of mind, logical, deficiency. Finally, I 
searched for keywords associated with legal experience: lawyer, law, law enforcement, police, 
cop, training, criminal justice system, legal [system, process].  
At the close of the questionnaire, all participants provided various demographic 
characteristics, such as age, gender, ethnicity, and education level. Judges provided an estimate of 
how many criminal trials they had presided over in their careers. Police estimated how many 
suspect interviews and interrogations they had conducted. Additionally, to ensure the quality of 
the MTurk and undergraduate data, lay adults participants completed an Oppenheimer 
instructional manipulation check (IMC; Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). Those who 
failed this check were a priori excluded from analyses. The last question of the study asked 
participants to type any additional comments or questions they had in an open text box. 
Hypotheses 
H1: I predicted a main effect of questioning type such that high custody vignettes would 
lead to greater perceptions of custody than low custody vignettes, with ambiguous vignettes 
eliciting more variability.  
H2: I predicted a main effect of sample such that lay adults would perceive more objective 
and subjective custody than police and judges. Due to their professional motivations and 
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experiences, I also predicted that police may exhibit a noncustody bias in which they would be 
more likely than others to view even the high custody vignette as noncustodial. 
H3: I predicted a 3-way interaction to indicate that the expected divergence in perceptions 
between the two legal professionals and lay participants would be greater in the high-crime 
severity conditions, where both judges and police would be influenced by professional motivations 
perceive non-custody. 
H4: Regarding the framing of the dependent measures, I predicted that although 
participants would judge suspects as objectively free to leave, they would be significantly more 
likely to indicate that he did not feel free to leave. As in Study 1 and in Alceste et al. (2018), I 
predicted that perspective-taking would attenuate the differences between all samples’ perceptions 
of freedom.  
Results and summary 
Binary custody judgments. Table 4 shows the percentages of participants in each sample 
and condition who responded “yes” to the three questions. In general, question type yielded the 
same pattern as in Study 1: participants thought the suspect was objectively more free to leave than 
he felt—and that they themselves would feel more free than he did.  Not surprisingly, low custody 
vignettes elicited the highest percentage of “yes” responses, and high custody vignettes elicited 
the lowest percentage of “yes” responses, and ambiguous vignettes fell between these extremes.  
Generally speaking, judges and police participants agreed in their perceptions of freedom. 
However, police were more likely than judges and laypeople to report that the suspect in the low 
custody vignette felt free to leave. In fact, the low custody vignette elicited the most variation 
among the three samples, as laypeople were even less likely than judges to report that the suspect 
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felt free in this scenario (all three samples agreed that the suspect was not in custody and 
objectively free to leave).  
 Dichotomous measures of freedom (yes—no). As in Study 1, I submitted the 
dichotomous objective, subjective, and perspective-taking judgments of freedom to logistic 
regression analyses with participant type, vignette type, and crime severity as categorical factors. 
Crime severity was not a significant predictor in any of the analyses, adding at most .015 to the 
overall R2. As such, it was removed from the final regression analyses. Hence, the final models 
that I report here present participant type and vignette regressed onto each dichotomous measure. 
Objective Inquiry: Was the person being questioned free to leave? This logistic regression 
model was significant, χ2 (638) = 328.84, p < .001, and explained 54.40% of the variance 
(Nagelkerke R2). First, controlling for participant type, those who read the ambiguous vignette vs. 
low custody vignette were almost 5 times more likely to indicate that the suspect was not free to 
leave (OR = 4.95; 95% CI [0.29, 2.91]; p = .016). Additionally, compared to those who read a low 
custody vignette, those who read the high custody vignette were more than 42 times more likely 
to report that the suspect was not free to leave (OR = 42.67; 95% CI [2.49, 5.02]; p < .001). There 
were no other significant effects in this model.  
Subjective Inquiry: Did the person being questioned feel free to leave? The model with 
the subjective question was also significant and accounted for 61.70% of the variance (Nagelkerke 
R2), χ2 (638) = 333.43, p < .001. Here, participant type and vignette type were both significant 
predictors of whether participants believed the suspect felt free to leave. Compared to laypeople, 
judges were 5.88 times more likely to report that the suspect did feel free, (OR = 0.17; 95% CI [-
2.51, -1.04]; p < .001). Similarly, police officers were 13.33 times more likely than laypeople to 
indicate the suspect did feel free, (OR = 0.075; 95% CI [-3.40, -1.77]; p < .001).  
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Across participant type, those who read an ambiguous vignette were 26.52 times more 
likely to believe the suspect did not feel free, compared to those who read the low custody vignette 
(OR = 26.52; 95% CI [1.23, 5.32]; p = .002). Not surprisingly, those who read the high custody 
vignette were also more likely to report that the suspect did not feel free than those who read the 
low vignette (OR = 13.26; 95% CI [1.09, 4.09]; p < .001).  
There was a participant type by vignette type interaction, showing that the difference in 
police officers’ responses between the high vs. low custody vignettes was greater than the 
difference between laypeople’s responses to high vs. low custody vignettes (OR = 28.90; 95% CI 
[.81, 5.92]; p = .01). Specifically, police responded “yes” more often than laypeople in the low 
custody vignette and less often than laypeople in the high custody vignette. Thus, the difference 
between police responses is greater between the two vignettes than the difference for laypeople. 
Police officers’ pattern of responses was very similar to judges’, but the regression model may not 
have identified this interaction as significant because of the lack of variation in judges’ responses 
to the subjective question in the high custody vignette (100% of the judges reported that the subject 
did not feel free; see Table 4), OR = 2.04 x 107; 95% CI [-1479.44, 1513.10]; p = .98. 
Perspective-taking Inquiry: Would you feel free to leave? The model for the perspective-
taking question was also highly significant, χ2 (638) = 271.19, p < .001, and accounted for 46.50% 
of the variance (Nagelkerke R2). Across vignette type, judges compared to laypeople were 25.64 
times more likely to say that they would feel free (OR = 0.034; 95% CI [-4.28, -2.21]; p < .001). 
Similarly, police compared to laypeople were 14.93 times more likely to say that they would feel 
free (OR = 0.067; 95% CI [-3.56, -1.84]; p < .001).  
Furthermore, across participant type, those who read the ambiguous vignette were more 
likely than those who read the low custody vignette to report that they would not feel free (OR = 
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2.21; 95% CI [0.006, 1.58]; p = .048). Those who read the high custody vignette were almost four 
times more likely than those who read the low custody vignette to say that they would not feel free 
to leave (OR = 3.99; 95% CI [0.49, 2.28]; p = .002). 
There were four two-way interactions that illustrated the same pattern: there was greater 
variation in legal participants’ responses between vignettes than there was in laypeople’s 
responses. Both police (OR = 18.68; 95% CI [1.55, 4.30]; p < .001) and judges (OR = 17.37; 95% 
CI [1.44, 4.27]; p < .001) displayed a greater difference in their perspective-taking responses 
between the ambiguous vs. low custody vignettes than laypeople. As shown in Table 4, police and 
judges were more likely to say that they would feel free to leave in the low custody vignette than 
laypeople did—their responses plummeted in the ambiguous vignette (more so than laypeople’s), 
but their overall percentage of “yes” responses was still higher than for laypeople. The same 
general pattern was true for the difference between high and low custody vignettes. The percentage 
of “yes” responses for police (OR = 7.19; 95% CI [.81, 3.13]; p < .001) and judges (OR = 8.48; 
95% CI [.85, 3.43]; p = .001) dropped dramatically between low and high custody vignettes—
more so than for laypeople, who were less likely to report that they would feel free in the low 
custody vignette than either legal sample to begin with. 
Continuous measures of freedom. In addition to rendering dichotomous judgments,  
participants were asked to what extent the subject of the questioning was free to leave (objective) 
and felt free to leave (subjective), as well as to rate how free they themselves would feel if they 
were in that situation (all ratings were made on a 1-10 point scale, where 1 = not free at all, 10 = 
totally free). As in Study 1, the three measures of freedom were all highly correlated with each 
other (see Table 2 for Pearson r’s). Plots of the frequency distributions for judges and police show 
the most variation in objective continuous responses for the ambiguous vignette (Figures 1 and 2). 
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I analyzed continuous perceptions of freedom within a 3 (subject: lay adult vs. judge vs. 
police) x 2 (crime severity: low vs. high) x 3 (vignette: low custody vs. ambiguous vs. high 
custody) x 3 (question type: objective vs. subjective vs. perspective-taking) mixed ANOVA design 
with question type as the repeated measures variable (see Table 5 for cell means, standard 
deviations, and sample sizes). After applying the Greenhouse-Geiser correction for a sphericity 
assumption violation, this analysis revealed three main effects, three two-way interactions, and 
one three-way interaction. I removed crime severity from the model because once again this 
variable did not have any significant effects on question type (all ps > .044; considering the size 
of all other significant effects, this most likely a Type 1 error). 
Main effects. First, there was a main effect of participant type, such that across question 
and vignette types, laypeople perceived the most restriction (M = 4.13, SD = 2.48), police 
perceived the least restriction (M = 5.08, SD = 3.59), and judges fell in between the two (M = 4.92, 
SD = 3.20), F (2, 627) = 11.03, p < .001, η2 = .016. Post-hoc analyses showed that laypeople 
differed significantly from judges (Mdiff = -.77, SE = .20, t = -3.81, pbonf <.001) and police (Mdiff = 
-.87, SE = .20, t = -4.32, pbonf  <.001), but that judges and police did not differ significantly (t = -
.49, pbonf  > 1.00). This result supports my hypothesis that laypeople would perceive more 
restriction of freedom compared to the two groups of legal professionals. 
There was also a main effect of vignette condition, F (2, 627) = 353.04, p < .001, η2 = .50. 
Across participant type and question type, participants viewed the low custody vignette as the least 
restrictive (M = 7.56, SD = 2.30), the high custody vignette as the most restrictive (M = 2.17, SD 
= 1.86), and the ambiguous vignette in between those two (M = 4.41, SD = 2.48). Post-hoc 
comparison tests showed that all three vignettes differed significantly from each other (all psbonf < 
.001): low custody yielded significantly higher perceptions of freedom than both the high custody 
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(Mdiff = 5.29, SE = .20, t = 26.44) and ambiguous vignettes (Mdiff = 3.13, SE = .20, t =15.51). The 
ambiguous and high custody vignettes also differed significantly (Mdiff = 2.16, SE = .20, t = 10.74). 
This finding supports the hypothesis that the high and low custody vignettes would differ 
significantly in the expected direction. 
As in Study 1, a main effect of question type (objective, subjective, perspective-taking) 
indicated that participants rated the suspect as objectively more free (M = 5.97, SD = 3.38) than he 
felt (M = 3.40, SD = 2.97) and themselves  as somewhere in between these metrics (M = 4.69, SD 
= 3.75), F (1.91, 1198.04) = 316.76, p < .001, η2 = .30. Post-hoc comparisons showed that the three 
questions differed significantly from each other, all psbonf < .001: participants rated the suspect as 
objectively more free than he felt (Mdiff = 2.56, SE = .12, t = 21.51) and more free than they would 
feel themselves (Mdiff = 1.31, SE = .11, t = 11.52). They also saw the suspect as feeling less free 
than they would feel (Mdiff = -1.26, SE = .10, t = -12.92). 
Two-way interactions. These main effects were qualified by three two-way interactions. 
First, a participant x vignette interaction showed that the three participant groups generally agreed 
that the ambiguous scenario (Mlay = 4.02, SD = 2.08; Mjudge = 4.81, SD = 2.58; Mpolice = 4.38, SD 
= 2.69) was less custodial than the high custody vignette (Mlay = 2.69, SD = 1.98; Mjudge = 1.98, 
SD = 1.62; Mpolice = 1.87, SD = 1.87). However, in the low custody vignette, laypeople (M = 5.72, 
SD = 2.40) perceived significantly less freedom than both judges (M = 8.03, SD = 1.77) and police 
(M = 8.70, SD = 1.62), F (4, 627) = 16.90, p < .001, η2 = .048. 
A question type x vignette interaction was also obtained, F (3.82, 1198.04) = 20.62, p < 
.001, η2 = .04. Here, both question type and vignette type yielded custody perceptions in the 
expected directions. Across participant type, participants asked whether the suspect was free 
(objective question) in the low custody vignette perceived the greatest amount of freedom (M = 
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8.83, SD = 1.98) and participants asked whether the suspect felt free (subjective question) in the 
high custody vignette indicated the lowest amount of perceived freedom (M = 1.43, SD = 1.06).  
A 2-way interaction between question type and participant group was also obtained, F 
(3.82, 1198.04) = 24.44, p < .001, η2 = .047. This interaction revealed two noteworthy findings. 
First, on the subjective question, police (M = 3.99, SD = 3.49) rated that the suspect felt 
significantly more free than did both judges (M = 3.33, SD = 2.76) and laypeople (M = 2.78, SD = 
2.32). This pattern also appeared in the perspective-taking question—when asked how free they 
would feel during an interrogation, both judges (M = 5.43, SD = 3.86) and police (M = 4.99, SD = 
3.94) rated that they would feel freer than did laypeople (M = 3.44, SD = 3.03). Overall, the three 
questions differed significantly from each other (all psbonf < .001) in the pattern previously 
discussed. Furthermore, laypeople perceived less freedom than did police (Mdiff = -.91, SE = .30, t 
= -3.00, pbonf = .008), but laypeople and judges (pbonf = .051) and judges and police (pbonf > .99) 
did not differ significantly from each other.  
Three-way interaction. Finally, the main effects and two-way interactions were qualified 
by a three-way interaction between question, participant group, and vignette, F (7.64, 1198.04) = 
2.45, p = .014, η2 = .009 (see Figure 3). This interaction indicated that police and judges overrated 
perceptions of freedom in the low custody vignette relative to lay participants.  In particular, police 
ratings of how free the suspect felt (M = 7.84, SD = 2.41) exceeded those of judges (M = 6.11, SD 
= 2.61) and importantly, those of laypeople (M = 4.54, SD = 2.80). Furthermore, on ratings of 
objective freedom, police (M = 9.55, SD = 1.09) and judges (M = 9.01, SD = 1.78) displayed a 
ceiling effect, suggesting that the low custody scenario would almost certainly result in non-
custodial judgments both in the police station and in the courtroom. Yet lay participants saw 
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significantly less objective freedom for the suspect in this scenario (M = 7.84, SD = 2.50), 
suggesting that lay and professional “objective” perceptions of this situation did not align.  
In the ambiguous vignette, all participants agreed on how free the suspect was and felt (cell 
means in Table 5). Not surprisingly, both judges (M = 5.29, SD = 3.69) and police (M = 4.39, SD 
= 3.44) reported that they would feel more free in the low-custody scenario than did lay participants 
(M = 3.09, SD = 2.70). In the high-custody vignette, which elicited overall means with significantly 
lower ratings, laypeople (M = 3.85, SD = 3.44) unexpectedly overrated how free the suspect was 
compared to both judges (M = 2.30, SD = 2.49) and police (M = 2.47, SD = 2.96).   
Exploratory analyses. At the end of the study, judges and police were asked to define the 
“reasonable person.” The average definition was 12.75 words in length (SD = 10.16, median = 10, 
min = 1, max = 110). Word count did not differ significantly by type of legal professional. 
Interestingly, however, these groups differed in how they conceptualized the reasonable person 
(see Table 6). Judges were more likely than police to cite intelligence as a defining characteristic 
of a reasonable person (41.00% vs. 29.10%, respectively), χ2 (1, N = 394) = 6.11, p = .013. Judges 
were also more likely than police to define the reasonable person as someone who is average or 
has typical characteristics (70.80% vs. 53.30%, respectively), χ2 (1, N = 394) = 12.80, p < .001. In 
contrast, police were more likely to cite the reasonable person’s mental stability than were judges 
(55.00% vs. 28.70%, respectively), χ2 (1, N = 395) = 27.99, p < .001. In total, 13.90% of 
participants cited legal experience, or lack thereof, as an important aspect of a reasonable person, 
but no differences were found between the two groups. It is important to note that the way I coded 
the legal experience category does not account for whether participants defined a reasonable 
person as someone who has some experience/knowledge of the law or someone who has no special 
legal experience or knowledge. Participants expressed both types of opinions. 
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Summary. In summary, Study 2 examined the effects of (1) legal profession and status, 
(2) crime severity, (3) objective circumstances of questioning sessions, and (4) framing of custody 
questions on perceptions of freedom. Crime severity had no effect on any outcome measures, 
suggesting that custody judgments are not influenced by the severity of the crime being 
investigated. Consistent with extensive pilot testing, low, ambiguous, and high custody vignettes 
yielded low, medium, and high custody judgments, respectively. Police officers and judges held 
similar viewpoints on whether a suspect was objectively free to leave, whether he felt free, 
subjectively, and whether they themselves would feel free in these same situations. In important 
ways, they sometimes disagreed significantly with each other and with laypeople. Specifically, 
judges and, to a greater extent, police overrated how free a suspect would feel in a seemingly low-
stakes interrogation. Coding of open-ended responses also showed that judges and police displayed 
significantly different conceptualizations of the “reasonable person.” 
General Discussion 
 “I think we all know that no one ever feels completely comfortable to walk away from 
 the police no matter what the circumstances. However, we have to have some line 
 between what is acceptable police conduct and what is not, and that is what I think the 
 definition of custody is aimed at delineating.” – Anonymous judge, participant 
 
 The state of police custody activates two important legal safeguards: Miranda warnings 
nationwide and the video-recording of interrogations in states that require it. Until recently, 
however, “custody” had never empirically been studied as a psychological construct. In two 
studies, Alceste et al. (2018) tested three assumptions, namely that certain objective conditions 
will elicit differing perceptions of custody vs. freedom; that the custody inquiry can be evaluated 
objectively using a “reasonable person” standard; and that noncustodial freedom can be ensured 
by explicitly advising suspects that they are free to leave. None of these assumptions was 
substantiated. Indeed, most participants in live sessions did not feel free to leave regardless of the 
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physical layout, tone, or duration of the questioning. Representing the first follow-ups to these 
studies, the current research expanded upon these results by testing legally-relevant populations of 
observers—namely, adolescents, judges, and police officers. 
Study 1 
My hypotheses for Study 1 were generally supported: as in Alceste et al. (2018), observers 
judged interrogations to be more restrictive than interviews, and this pattern held true for both 
adults and adolescents. Consistent with previous studies on adolescent comprehension of Miranda 
warnings, compliance with adult authority, and vulnerability to false confessions, adolescents 
viewed both types of questioning sessions as more restrictive overall than adults. In contrast to 
previous research (e.g. Abramovitch et al., 1995; Grisso, 1981; Haney-Caron et al., 2018), younger 
vs. older adolescents did not differ in their perceptions. This pattern of results suggests that 
adolescents of all ages feel constrained in the presence of a law enforcement authority. It is 
important to note, however, that the lack of difference may be have resulted from a sampling 
artifact in that there were more 13-15-year olds (n = 88) than 16-19-year olds (n = 62); hence, the 
sample was likely underpowered to adequately detect intra-group age differences. 
Though there was no difference between adolescents of different ages, adults and 
adolescents did differ significantly in their perceptions. This finding might be explained by 
evaluating the naturalistic levels of autonomy that distinguish children and adults in all domains 
of experience. Adult participants in Study 1 were Amazon MTurk workers who independently 
signed up for an MTurk account, perused the site at their leisure, chose to participate in this 
particular study, and were paid for their time. In contrast, all adolescent participants needed 
permission from their parents to participate; they received the link to the study from a teacher; and 
most likely they completed the study during breaks throughout the school day. For adolescents, 
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the omnipresence of authority figures and rules of permission offers a constant and salient 
reminder of their lack of autonomy. Indeed, high school students can seldom use the restroom 
during class time without express permission from a teacher—and they are certainly not allowed 
to leave class, wander the halls, or leave the campus without an adult.  The saliency of these norms 
may well explain why adolescents perceived more restriction than adults.  
In a review of differences between adult and adolescent decision-making, Furby and Beyth-
Marom (1992) explained that these groups differ in the choices they make not as a function of 
competency, but rather because they value information differently. In Study 1, both participant 
groups appropriately identified the objective differences between interviews and interrogations at 
the same rate (e.g., whether the subject of the questioning had an ally present in the room, whether 
the guard accused the subject, etc.). Adolescents did not misremember these factors or perceive 
the questioning sessions as more restrictive than they objectively were—for instance, they did not 
remember that the door was closed when it was actually open. Therefore, as Furby and Beyth-
Marom suggested, it may be that juveniles simply have a lower threshold for what seems 
restrictive, especially in high-stakes situations that involve authority figures. In other words, teens 
may have discounted those factors which would reasonably signal freedom to an adult.  
Another explanation for the difference between adults and adolescents may be found in the 
open-ended responses for why the subject stayed in the room. The vast majority of adolescents—
significantly more than adults—spontaneously indicated that the subject stayed because s/he did 
not want to appear guilty (e.g. “Due to the fact that leaving during questioning is considered to be 
highly suspicious, and no matter what the reason you provide the officer with, you’re borderline 
admitting to the crime.”). In contrast, adults were significantly more likely than adolescents to 
indicate that the subject was just trying to be helpful (e.g. “Because he saw nothing wrong with 
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cooperating.”). The potential benefits of staying and clearing one’s name may outweigh the risk 
of escaping the situation if escaping also means appearing guilty to the security guard. By 
endorsing this tactical approach to staying put, participants may be relying on the illusion of 
transparency (Gilovich & Savitsky, 1999)—in this case, the belief that their innocence will become 
transparent to others (Kassin, 2005).  
The totality of the circumstances in the custody inquiry has only recently been amended to 
include the age of the suspect (J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 2011). Though the U.S. Supreme Court 
in J.D.B. most likely drew from other relevant aspects of developmental psychology in its decision 
to include age as a relevant custody factor, Study 1 is the first empirical study to show that 
adolescents perceive custody and freedom differently than adults. One important implication of 
this result is that minors should not be subjected to the “reasonable person” standard, as adults are, 
but instead should be specially protected not only from accusatorial interrogations but from 
noncustodial interviews as well.  
The objective circumstances of the interviews used in Study 1 were carefully designed by 
Alceste et al. (2018) to represent a questioning session that courts would find noncustodial. 
Importantly, although interviews elicited significantly higher judgments of freedom than 
interrogations, the means for all three continuous measures seldom broke the midpoint on the scale. 
These very low means indicate that participants may have merely seen these individuals as “less 
restricted”—not necessarily as free to leave. Additionally, the low scores may indicate that lay 
participants, even adults, are more sensitive to feelings of restriction than is currently accounted 
for in relevant case law. There was an unexpected interaction in the logistic regression for the 
subjective question in which adolescents who watched the interrogation were significantly more 
likely to report that the subject felt free to leave than those who watched an interview. There is no 
59 
 
theoretical explanation for this deviation from the expected results, and the pattern was not 
observed with the continuous measure for the same question. Though the odds ratio was 
substantial, the magnitude of the difference was only around 7%, which is a difference of n = 4. 
Therefore, I conclude that this result was likely a Type I error. 
Perspective-taking and the better-than-average effect. Regarding question type, 
participants consistently saw the subject as objectively freer than s/he felt. They also saw 
themselves as falling between these two points, not feeling as free as an objective criterion would 
predict but seeing themselves as feeling freer than the subject felt. In Study 1, adolescents and 
adults displayed different patterns of responses. Post-hoc comparisons between laypeople and 
adolescents showed that the effect of question type was mainly driven by the adults, as adolescents 
did not report that they would feel significantly freer than the subject in the video. Adolescents 
only distinguished between the two sessions with regard to the objective question, such that those 
in interrogations were deemed to be significantly less free than those in interviews. Teens’ 
perceptions of how free they would have felt mirrored how free they believed the subject felt, 
suggesting that they projected their own feelings of restriction onto the subject in the questioning. 
Adults, however, differentiated between interviews and interrogations across all three question 
types. Though this finding supports the prediction that the framing of the question has a significant 
impact on people’s perceptions, it contradicts the results of Alceste et al. (2018) in which the 
perspective-taking question attenuated the differences between interviews and interrogations.  
That participants consistently imagined themselves feeling freer to leave than the subject 
felt may be interpreted as a belief in one’s own resilience in the face of adversity compared to 
others—this is a variant of self-enhancement tendency called the better-than-average (BTA) effect 
(see Alicke & Govorun, 2005 for a review). Much like in the present studies, participants in BTA 
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effect studies who make social comparisons between themselves and someone else typically 
believe themselves to be better than the average person. This tendency is robust. Indeed, a 
multitude of studies have focused on testing moderating factors to determine how to enhance and 
decrease the BTA effect. One study found that ambiguity moderates the BTA effect; that is, when 
participants are asked to rate themselves on a trait with an ambiguous definition, they provide more 
self-serving evaluations (Dunning, Meyerowitz & Holzberg, 1989). Perhaps other types of 
ambiguity similarly moderate the BTA effect, such as the uncertainty as to whether someone in an 
interrogation is legally allowed to terminate questioning. The only time custody is not at all 
ambiguous is when the suspect has been arrested, which was not the case in the videos in Study 1 
or the vignettes in Study 2.  
Another study found that comparing oneself to others on positive and controllable traits 
also enhances the BTA effect (Alicke, 1985). It could be the case that participants construe 
defending themselves against the police by getting up and leaving a questioning session as a 
positive and controllable behavior, and thus participants were more likely to report that they would 
have acted in this manner. Importantly, comparing oneself to an actual person, rather than to an 
average hypothetical peer decreases the BTA effect—but comparing oneself to someone in a video 
(as in Study 1) or in a transcript (as in Study 2) attenuates that downward moderation (Alicke et 
al., 1995). One recent study out of Poland is especially relevant, as it includes participants’ 
judgments of whether they would resist pressure from an authority figure. Grzyb and Dolinski 
(2017) showed online participants a video detailing the events of the classic Milgram shock 
experiment. After the video, participants indicated at which point they would have refused to 
continue in the experiment, and then estimated at which point an average peer would have done 
the same. Results showed that participants predicted that they would terminate significantly earlier 
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than the average other (even participants who were familiar with Milgram’s obedience studies 
displayed this effect). Thus, the pattern of results observed for question type in both studies 
suggests that participants may believe that they would be more resilient and thus fare better than 
the average person in an interrogation scenario.  
Study 2 
 By comparing legal professionals and lay participants, Study 2 yielded interesting results. 
As predicted, the low-custody vignette elicited significantly greater perceptions of freedom than 
the high custody vignette; the ambiguous vignette fell between these extremes. By design, the 
ambiguous condition exemplified the simultaneous presence of both custodial and noncustodial 
factors in most interrogations that the U.S. Supreme Court has examined with respect to custody. 
Importantly, the ambiguous vignette yielded the greatest amount of variation in the continuous 
custody measures for both police and judges, two groups who are versed in case law and purport 
to follow objective guidelines for determining custody (Figures 1 and 2). The variation present in 
this condition suggests that the totality of the circumstances analysis does not yield consistent, 
interrater-reliable custody decisions. Indeed, both judges and police acknowledged that custody is 
complex and important to study (e.g. “These types of issues are difficult and take a lot of thought. 
It can be difficult to decide when custodial interrogation begins” [judge]; “I think the gray area of 
custody is ever changing and hazy for some law enforcement officers” [police]). 
Results showed that judges and police perceived significantly more freedom across all 
custody vignettes than laypeople. Laypeople’s perceptions for all three question types, though 
especially for the subjective question, represent a kind of criterion validity check on legal 
participants’ perceptions. That is, laypeople’s perceptions of how free the suspect felt is the closest 
characterization of how a real suspect would feel in each scenario, and thus represents a standard 
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to which other perceptions should be compared. Though police and judges may harbor different 
career-relevant motivations, they did not differ significantly in their custody perceptions. One 
might expect police to display a motivated noncustody bias in which they are more likely in general 
to perceive even the high custody vignette as noncustodial. This pattern of results only occurred 
in the low custody vignette, where legal professionals significantly overrated objective and 
subjective perceptions of freedom compared to laypeople. Although lay perceptions of objective 
freedom were high in the low-custody vignette compared to the others, they were significantly 
lower than those of the legal professionals. Furthermore, the subjective question yielded an even 
greater divergence in perceptions between the three groups in the low custody vignette: police 
overrated how free the suspect felt in the low custody condition compared to the standard set by 
laypeople (judges also overrated this measure, but by a smaller margin; Figure 3B). Taken 
together, these results suggest, counterintuitively, that an interrogation situation that seems 
noncustodial may in fact prove to be among the most coercive. To use the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
words in Oregon v. Elstad, police may be “ill-equipped” to judge perceptions of custody in 
seemingly noncustodial settings (1985, p. 316). The appearance of voluntariness provided by the 
noncustodial factors may preclude suspects from being afforded the legal protections that custody 
triggers in cases where they still feel restriction. 
Interestingly, analyses revealed the opposite pattern in the high custody vignette. This time, 
laypeople overrated the suspect’s objective freedom compared to legal professionals. It appears 
that police and judges know for certain that an interrogation with so many custodial factors is 
coercive enough to preclude a suspect from being free to leave, but the layperson is naïve to those 
objective factors and the effects they have on the legal custody analysis.  
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Crime severity was varied to test the hypothesis that when the stakes are high, police and 
possibly judges as well, but not lay participants, would set a higher bar for what constitutes custody 
in order solve the more serious crime. Interestingly, no support was obtained for this hypothesis 
as crime severity had no significant effects. Across two very different crimes with vastly different 
sentencing implications—a non-violent burglary and murder—legal professionals exhibited the 
same pattern of custody perceptions. Although it may seem reasonable for higher stakes crimes to 
induce greater feelings of restriction in a suspect than lower stakes crimes, to my knowledge, there 
is nothing in the case law to suggest that the seriousness of the crime must be factored into 
perceptions of custody. Practically speaking, the null effect of crime severity suggests that our 
results are generalizable across crime type. 
Finally, with regard to the objective, subjective, and perspective-taking custody questions, 
results showed that participants inferred that the suspect was objectively more free than he felt. On 
the perspective-taking question, however, police and judges imagined themselves to feel 
significantly freer than lay adults did. This result makes common sense since legal professionals 
are well-versed in their rights and have substantial power in the legal system.  As one police officer 
put it, “There is a biased [sic] amongst law enforcement personnel, as we know we don’t have to 
answer any questions, if I were asked. But the common public does not know this and falls into 
that ‘trap.’” Thompson v. Keohane (1995) and Alceste et al. (2018) suggested that perhaps legal 
decision makers should imagine themselves in the suspect’s position while evaluating custody. 
Given the results in Study 2 that judges and police do not set aside their privileged positions of 
power when imagining themselves in the suspect’s position, the perspective-taking question may 
not be an effective way for them to decide custody.   
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Because the courts have written extensively about the importance of using objective 
standards for custody determinations (e.g. Stansbury v. California, 1994), judges would likely 
object to using a subjective question to determine the custody inquiry. The assumption is that an 
objective test is preferable to considering each suspect’s individual characteristics to determine 
whether s/he feels free or restricted. Indeed, the objective question yielded mostly similar 
responses from judges and police in both the high and low custody vignettes. But real cases with 
disputed confessions are not usually so unequivocally (non)custodial. The ambiguous vignette is 
especially relevant in this study because it most closely represents the mixture of custodial and 
noncustodial factors present in real interrogations. It does not require careful inspection of the 
frequency distributions of the ambiguous vignettes for both judges (Figure 1B) and police (Figure 
2B) to observe notable discrepancies in their objective responses to this scenario. Within the 
sample of judges, for example, 23 participants in the ambiguous situation rated the suspect a “10” 
on the 1-10 point scale as objectively free to leave; yet another 23 judges in that condition rated 
the suspect a 1, 2, or 3 on the same 10-point scale. With judicial disparities of this magnitude, one 
has to question the wisdom of the so-called objective test.  
How can an objective question yield such variation?  Grano (1979) suggested that different 
observers weigh the impact of objective circumstances differently. Another possibility is that the 
way judges determine custody depends on their personal definition of the “reasonable person.”  
Study 2 found a considerable amount of disagreement among police and judges in what constitutes 
a reasonable person for the purposes of the custody inquiry. Judges were more likely than police 
to reference intelligence as a relevant factor (e.g. “A person of reasonable intelligence placed in 
the same circumstances as the individual involved”) and to indicate that a reasonable person is 
someone with average, common, ordinary, or normal characteristics, particularly intelligence (e.g. 
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“Someone of average intelligence and life experience”). In contrast, police officers were more 
likely to reference the reasonable person’s psychological state, either in terms of mental and 
emotional health (e.g. “Someone without significant mental deficiencies”) or sobriety (e.g. “A 
person not under the influence of mind-altering substance with a common understanding of his/her 
rights”). Though police and judges did not cite the reasonable person’s knowledge or experience 
in the law at significantly different rates, the range of their responses in this category illustrates 
the disagreement between and within samples. Some judges and police officers defined the 
reasonable person as someone with no knowledge (“A reasonable citizen without knowledge of the 
law” [police]), some knowledge (“Person not familiar with the criminal justice system but has 
some knowledge based on books, tv, etc.” [judge]), and average knowledge of the legal system 
(“…average… awareness of the how the legal system operates” [judge]). Others emphasized that 
the reasonable person is a non-lawyer or non-police officer, but did not mention experience with 
law enforcement as a suspect, witness, or victim. Others specified minimal or limited contact with 
law enforcement, or someone “unacquainted” with the legal system, which could include justice-
involved individuals. Taken together, the nearly 400 definitions collected in this study demonstrate 
a fundamental difference in conceptualizations of the reasonable person standard. At worst, this 
difference could mean that custodial protections are offered to criminal suspects at different rates, 
depending on who makes the final custody judgment. This is a substantial problem because 
suspects who confess without these protections could be giving coerced confessions that are 
difficult to identify at a later time. In addition, the malleability of custody judgments across 
decision makers increases the risk that so-called objective judgments can be biased by race, ethnic 
background, and other stereotypes. 
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In addition to revealing the kinds of information legal professionals consider relevant to 
the custody inquiry, the open-ended responses that participants provided (both to the reasonable 
person definition and invitation to provide additional comments) demonstrated a high level of 
engagement in the study. The average definition of the reasonable person was almost 13 words 
long; of the 83 legal participants who typed an additional comment or question longer than one 
word (e.g. “None;” “Interesting;” “Thanks”), the average comment was 45.82 words long. In both 
instances, participants expanded on the objective factors they found most relevant, described what 
kind of additional information they would have found useful, drew attention to the free-to-leave 
advisement, and expressed an interest in learning the results of the study. It is also worth noting 
that several judges emailed to confirm that they had completed the study, express dissatisfaction 
with the materials, solicit more information about the case, indicate a desire to discuss the study 
with colleagues, suggest improvements to future research. One judge shared a personal photograph 
of his young daughter at a school science fair where she presented original research on eyewitness 
misidentification and wrongful convictions. In all, the level of engagement suggested by these 
responses is encouraging to researchers who wish to study the perspectives of police and judges 
and indicate that participants in this study were thoughtful and attentive.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Studies 1 and 2 answer some important questions about how relevant populations perceive 
custody. At the same time, these studies suggest issues to be addressed in future research. First, in 
Study 1, the two samples of adolescents recruited from a high school differed significantly in their 
perceptions of freedom. Specifically, students in the first round of data collection (Mtotal = 4.12, 
SD = 1.75) perceived more freedom than those from the second round (Mtotal = 3.19, SD = 1.52). 
One explanation is a significant age difference in the two samples. All second-round students were 
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ninth graders, so they were younger (M = 14.36, SD = 0.75) than those who participated in the first 
round (M = 15.74, SD = 1.19).  Although a plausible explanation, internal analyses of the data do 
not support it for two reasons: (1) age did not make a difference in the formal analyses and (2) the 
second-round high school students also differed significantly in age from the summer program 
students in the sample (ptukey <.001), but they did not differ in perceptions of freedom (ptukey >1.00). 
A second explanation involves the difference in testing conditions between the first and second 
round of high school students. Students in the first round completed the study online; due to an 
initial low response rate, students in the second round completed the study during class time.  
Hence, first- and second-round students completed the study under differing testing conditions. In 
future studies, it would be desirable to ensure uniformity in this regard.  
Regardless of this sampling difference, adolescents viewed both interviews and 
interrogations as more restrictive than did adults. However, this study merely presented videos of 
other people—importantly, other adults—being questioned. A more realistic measure of 
adolescents’ custody judgments might be obtained in a study akin to Alceste et al.’s (2018) studies 
in which innocent participants were involved in a contrived investigation and provided their 
perceptions of freedom after being questioned. Such a study with adolescents as actors would have 
to be carefully designed so as not to induce an undue amount of stress in participants, and even 
then, there may be additional ethical issues that may preclude this type of research. Alternatively, 
adolescent and even child participants could be presented with a video or narrative involving the 
questioning of a suspect who matches their age and gender, as in Haney-Caron, Goldstein, and 
Mesiarik’s (2018) study on perceptions of confession behavior during the holding and 
interrogation process (P-CHIP). Haney-Caron et al. had experimenters read aloud such scenarios 
to underage participants, varying the age and gender of the suspect to match the participant, and 
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asked the minor to imagine that s/he was the suspect. Following the story and descriptions of 26 
police holding and interrogation tactics, the experimenters asked the participants how likely it is 
that the suspect would confess to the crime even if s/he did not commit it. The authors found that 
significantly more 12-14-year-old participants than those of other age groups reported that they 
were leaning towards falsely confessing or that they would definitely confess. Adapting the P-
CHIP procedure to a study on custody might provide an ethical and effective way to test minors’ 
perceptions of freedom without putting them at risk for an adverse incident. 
Also with regard to sampling, the adolescent participants in Study 1 was predominantly 
White (69.90%) and female (66.00%). Future research should explore whether the findings in this 
study generalize across more representative samples of adolescents in terms of race, ethnic 
background, contact with the legal system, and other potentially relevant individual difference 
factors.  
 Turning to Study 2, it is important to note that the materials used were purposely formulated 
for readability, conciseness, and ease of interpretation in order to increase the rate of responses 
and not present a burdensome task for the legal participants. With this goal in mind, information 
was not included about the suspect’s personal characteristics or previous history with law 
enforcement, evidence gathered by the police in their investigation, or how the individual came to 
be a suspect. Though no layperson reported dissatisfaction with the amount of information 
provided, several judge and police participants commented on the relative lack of information 
provided.  Requests for more information varied from broad questions (e.g. “Were the detectives 
wearing guns?” [police]) to specifics regarding the police officer’s tone during the questioning 
(e.g. “When the [vignette] informs us that the suspect was ‘asked’ to take a polygraph, how was 
the question asked? What tone was used? What exact verbiage was employed?” [judge]). In 
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particular, both police and judges inquired whether the suspect was taken “deep in the bowels of 
the police department” through multiple secured doors controlled by law enforcement personnel. 
Though some details were powerful enough to compel a decision about custody (e.g. confiscation 
of the suspect’s shoes; not allowing the suspect to change out of his nightwear before being taken 
to the station), often other details were sought.   
The requests for additional information were unexpected, considering that the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Beheler specifies that the amount of information the police have about a suspect 
is irrelevant to the custody inquiry. Regardless, future research might reasonably include a larger 
casefile with evidence and interrogation descriptions that include the kinds of details participants 
sought here. Perhaps more information would reduce the variability of perceptions, especially 
among legal professionals; perhaps it would have precisely the opposite effect. It would be 
especially interesting to adapt such materials from specific custody cases in the literature to assess  
the extent to which  police officers and judges draw the same conclusions as the Supreme Court 
did. For example, one might present participants with the same objective circumstances as 
presented in Stansbury v. California (1984) or Howes vs. Fields (2012) and compare their custody 
judgments to those of the Court.  
Additionally, instead of asking legal participants to define the reasonable person standard 
after they make custody evaluations, future research might systematically vary a priori the 
definition of “reasonable person” and examine its effects on custody perceptions. For instance, 
researchers might use Miller and Perry’s (2012) normative and positive definitions or others and 
ask participants to judge custody based on these differing standards. Normative definitions ask the 
evaluator to consider an equation: namely, whether the risk of harm multiplied by the magnitude 
of that harm is greater than the burden of removing the risk. This formula for cost-effectiveness is 
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an early standard for the kinds of actions that are expected from reasonable people in society. 
Positive definitions, on the other hand, are based on empirical evidence and represent the kinds of 
actions the “average” person would take to avoid harm. Study 2 showed that most legal participants 
use positive definitions of the reasonable person, as most responses included some variation on 
the notion of typicality. Though Miller and Perry described the reasonable person definitions with 
regard to tort law, the definitions can be reframed and applied to the custody inquiry. Researchers 
can then use these new definitions and systematically instruct legal participants to judge custody 
through the specified lens in hopes of observing converging perceptions of freedom. 
Another interesting finding from the open-ended comments study was that several legal 
participants found the subjective question troubling. Comments from both police and judges such 
as “Poorly worded questions—particularly the ‘feel’ inquiries” and “How the hell would I know 
what he felt?” illustrate that “Did the suspect feel free to leave?” was an unfamiliar question in the 
custody analysis. These are interesting objections, considering the objective inquiry is whether a 
reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have felt free to leave, and the study materials 
gave participants no reason to believe the suspect was anything other than a reasonable person. 
Judges also expressed strong objections to a question about the suspect’s guilt, which I removed 
before data collection was completed due to the fact that judge participants emailed me and refused 
to complete their participation if the guilt question remained in the study. 
Finally, there is one additional group of participants worthy of testing: Social 
psychologists—experts on social influence.  In 1958, Heider described the notion of common-
sense psychology—that people try to understand, interpret, and predict people’s behavior based 
on what they can observe. But without a deeper understanding of psychological processes, these 
interpretations and predictions may be subject to critical errors. In this way, judges essentially play 
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the role of social psychologists while determining the totality of the circumstances in a custody 
inquiry—they consider the characteristics of the situation and analyze how they might impact the 
subject’s behavior and mental processes. Though social psychologists have no official place in the 
legal decision-making process, it would be interesting to assess their perceptions of freedom in 
interpersonal situations involving familiar processes (e.g., social perception, compliance, 
obedience to authority, and persuasion) that much resemble behavior in the psychology laboratory.   
In light of research on the efficacy of Miranda (Kassin, 2005; Kassin & Norwick, 2004; 
Smalarz et al., 2016) as well as the curative effects of video recording interrogations (Kassin, 
Kukucka, Lawson, & DeCarlo, 2014; 2017, Kassin et al., 2019), it is important to test for and 
understand the condition that triggers—or fails to trigger—these legal safeguards. For years, legal 
scholars have speculated about current custody standards and possible defects (Grano, 1979; 
Lewis, 2007; Tull, 2015; Weisselberg, 2008). The current studies provide data that challenge the 
courts’ “objective” and “reasonable person” definitions in a transformative way. Ultimately, this 
line of research may not only inform the courts but help to inform the work of the Innocence 
Project (https://www.innocenceproject.org/) and others to prevent wrongful convictions 
attributable to police-induced false confessions.  
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Table 1 
Study 1: Percentage of yes/no responses by participant type, 
condition, and question type 
Objective    
Custody Adolescent Adult Total 
Interview 47.22 63.87 57.60c 
Interrogation 29.87 52.14 43.10d 
Total 38.00a 58.10b   
    
Subjective    
Custody Adolescent Adult Total 
Interview 5.41 22.69 16.10c 
Interrogation 12.82 12.40 12.60d 
Total 9.20a 17.50b   
    
Perspective-taking   
Custody Adolescent Adult Total 
Interview 18.92 34.45 28.50c 
Interrogation 18.18 25.41 22.70c 
Total 18.50a 30.00b   
Note: Within “Total” rows and columns, values that do not share a subscript letter are 
significantly different (ps > .05) 
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Table 2 
Studies 1 and 2: Pearson correlations for question type 
 Study  Objective Subjective Perspective-taking 
Objective     
     
Subjective 1 0.43   
 2 0.63   
     
Perspective-taking 1 0.59 0.58  
 2 0.71 0.75  
Note: Numbers represent Pearson rs. All correlations are significant, p < .001 
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Table 3 
Study 1 cell means (SD; n)   
Objective    
  Adolescent 
Adult 
Interview  5.17 (2.12; 73) 6.03 (2.95; 117) 
Interrogation 4.16 (2.03; 78) 5.21 (3.21; 119) 
    
Subjective    
  Adolescent Adult 
Interview  3.14 (1.48; 65) 3.96 (2.56; 114) 
Interrogation 3.02 (1.75; 71) 3.03 (2.44; 119) 
    
Perspective-taking    
  Adolescent Adult 
Interview  3.49 (2.29; 61) 4.56 (3.34; 114) 
Interrogation 3.24 (2.25; 68) 3.82 (2.89; 121) 
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Table 4 
Study 2: Percentage of yes/no responses by vignette type, 
participant type, and question type 
 
      
Objective     
 Custody Laypeople Judges Police Total 
 High 33.33 13.51 18.92 21.70b 
 Ambiguous 81.16 66.67 64.29 70.60c 
 Low 95.52 94.52 100.00 96.80d 
 Total 69.80a 58.00b 61.90b   
      
Subjective     
 Custody Laypeople Judges Police Total 
 High 2.90 0.00 1.35 1.40c 
 Ambiguous 1.47 7.25 11.43 6.80c 
 Low 28.36 70.00 84.00 61.80d 
 Total 10.80a 25.50b 32.90b   
      
Perspective-taking     
 Custody Laypeople Judges Police Total 
 High 11.59 16.22 9.46 12.40c 
 Ambiguous 19.12 41.62 32.86 31.40d 
 Low 34.33 93.06 88.61 73.40e 
 Total 21.60a 50.00b 44.80b   
Note: Within “Total” rows and columns, values that do not share a subscript letter are 
significantly different (ps > .05) 
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Table 5 
Study 2 cell means (SD; n)   
Objective    
  Laypeople Judges Police 
High 3.85 (3.44; 69) 2.30 (2.49; 74) 2.47 (2.96; 74) 
Ambiguous 6.58 (3.14; 69) 6.07 (3.38; 71) 6.06 (3.68; 70) 
Low 7.84 (2.50; 67) 9.01 (1.78; 73) 9.55 (1.09; 79) 
    
Subjective    
  Laypeople Judges Police 
High 1.69 (1.16; 68) 1.31 (0.76; 74) 1.31 (1.18; 74) 
Ambiguous 2.15 (1.57; 69) 2.67 (1.88; 71) 2.70 (2.32; 70) 
Low 4.54 (2.80; 67) 6.11 (2.61; 70) 7.84 (2.41; 75) 
    
Perspective-taking    
  Laypeople Judges Police 
High 2.49 (2.48; 69) 2.32 (2.34; 74) 1.81 (2.36; 74) 
Ambiguous 3.09 (2.70; 68) 5.29 (3.69; 72) 4.39 (3.44; 70) 
Low 4.78 (3.41; 67) 8.84 (2.08; 72) 8.69 (2.18; 79) 
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Table 6 
Study 2: Frequency of each category in legal participants’ open-ended definitions of the 
“reasonable person” for purposes of custody. 
Category Participant Frequency 
 Judge 41.00 
Intelligence Police 29.10 
 Total 35.00 
   
 Judge 70.80 
Average Police 53.30 
 Total 61.90 
   
 Judge 28.70 
Sound Mind Police 55.00 
 Total 42.00 
   
 Judge 15.40 
Legal Experience Police 12.50 
  Total 13.90 
Note: Numbers represent percentages (e.g., 41.00% of judges cited intelligence in their open-
ended definition of the reasonable person). 
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Figure 1 (A, B, C) 
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(C) 
 
 
Frequency distributions for judges’ responses to the objective continuous custody question by 
vignette type. 
Note: y-axis scales differ for each graph 
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Figure 2 (A, B, C) 
 (A) 
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(C) 
 
 
Frequency distributions for police responses to the objective continuous custody question by 
vignette type. 
Note: y-axis scales differ for each graph 
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Figure 3 (A, B, C) 
(A) 
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(C) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Three-way interaction between question type, vignette type, and participant type in Study 2. Bars 
represent standard errors. 
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Appendix 
Crime descriptions 
Low crime severity. On a summer night, in a mid-sized city in the northeast of the US, 
police received a 911 call from a woman who reported hearing a commotion and then seeing an 
intruder run from the home next door. When two officers arrived, they found that the home had 
been broken into and burglarized. A TV and jewelry were missing from the master bedroom. The 
owner, Ms. Jeanine Sukaro, was not home. 
Detective Mark Comstock led the investigation. His team dusted for prints, scoured the 
scene for trace evidence, and determined that a front window served as the point of entry. He 
also interviewed neighbors about what they heard and took a description of the individual seen 
running out the front door.  
Based on a month-long investigation, Det. Comstock identified a person of interest to be 
questioned. What follows is a description of how this individual was questioned.  
High crime severity. On a summer night, in a mid-sized city in the northeast of the US, 
police received a 911 call from a woman who reported hearing a commotion and then seeing an 
intruder run from the home next door. When two officers arrived, they found that the home had 
been broken into and burglarized. A TV and jewelry were missing from the master bedroom. The 
bloodied body of the owner, Jeanine Sukaro, was found in a closet. Defensive wounds indicated 
that she fought with her intruder before being shot in the head and killed. 
Detective Mark Comstock led the investigation. His team dusted for prints, scoured the 
scene for trace evidence, and determined that a front window served as the point of entry. He 
also interviewed neighbors about what they heard and took a description of the individual seen 
running out the front door.  
Based on a month-long investigation, Det. Comstock identified a person of interest to be 
questioned. What follows is a description of how this individual was questioned.  
Vignettes 
Low custody. Person-of-interest David Hansen: After failing to reach Mr. Hansen by 
phone, Detective Comstock sent Officers Lamar Smith and Ryan Bell to his apartment. When 
they arrived, they asked if he would be willing to answer questions. They set a meeting time at 
the local police station. When Hansen arrived, Detective Comstock, who was waiting for him 
near the front entrance, introduced himself and offered Hansen a coffee. The two men sat in 
chairs at the reception area of the station. 
The interview lasted for 45 minutes. During that time, Det. Comstock indicated that he 
was investigating a crime. After reminding Hansen that he is free to leave at any time, Det. 
Comstock asked Hansen to recall everything he could about his whereabouts on the day and 
time in question. When Hansen wavered and could not provide a solid alibi for the [murder] 
burglary, Comstock challenged him and pressed him to think harder. He asked, “You’re sure you 
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were not in the neighborhood that day?” Then he asked if there was anyone else in the area that 
Hansen might suspect, anyone that police should speak to next. Hansen had no one to name. 
Ambiguous. Person-of-interest Ed Benning: Officers Lamar Smith and Ryan Bell 
phoned Mr. Benning and asked him to drive to the police station after he left his work at 7:00pm. 
Once he arrived at the station, the two officers escorted him to the interview room, where 
Detective Comstock was waiting to ask Benning some questions about the incident at Jeanine 
Sukaro’s house. Comstock said, “Thank you for coming to the station to help us out. We’d 
appreciate it if you would submit your cell phone and shoes for forensic testing.” Benning 
handed these items to Comstock, who sealed them in evidence bags. He did not tell Benning 
when the items would be returned. 
 Det. Comstock also asked Benning to take a polygraph exam. During that exam, he 
accused Benning of breaking into Ms. Sukaro’s home [and killing her]. Although the results of 
the polygraph were inconclusive, Comstock told Benning that the exam indicated deception in 
his denials. He said that if he kept lying about his involvement, police would get a warrant to 
search his car. Twice during the 2-hour questioning, Benning told Comstock that he did not want 
to talk any more. 
High custody. Person-of-interest Carl Dixon: Detective Comstock sent uniformed 
Officers Lamar Smith and Ryan Bell to pick up Mr. Dixon at his home. When they arrived at 
9:00pm, they told Dixon that he needed to come with them to answer questions about a crime. 
Dixon asked if he could change out of his sweats and t-shirt. But Smith said no and gestured 
Dixon to get into the back of the squad car. 
 Once they arrived at the station, the officers escorted Dixon to a small, bare, windowless 
room with three chairs. They locked the door behind them. Detective Comstock joined in, stood 
in front of Dixon, and accused him: “We know for a fact that you broke into Jeanine Sukaro’s 
home [and shot her in the head]. You’re better off cooperating than lying to me.” Detective 
Comstock told Dixon that he was identified by an eyewitness and caught on a surveillance 
camera outside. Both claims were untrue. The questioning lasted for nearly 8 hours, into the 
early morning. Twice Dixon asked for a bathroom break. Each time he was escorted by an 
officer and returned to the interview room. 
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